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INTRODUCTION

Culture, as much as climate, was responsible for the development of
water law in the West. Through more frequent recognition of public rights
by western state courts, culture is once again becoming a principal author
of western water rights. The rewriting of these laws is intertwined with
controversy and uncertainty.
Widespread aridity is commonly credited with creating the need for
the prior appropriation doctrine, a water management regime uniquely
fashioned to the western states. While this interpretation of the development of the prior appropriation doctrine is fundamentally correct, it
ignores the intervening but important influence of history and culture upon
the water allocation and management systems that arose in the West.
The prior appropriation doctrine was developed in response to the
physical need to transport water out of streambeds and lake beds to service
mining claims, to irrigate farms, and to support nearby communities. The
doctrine, however, was also a judicial recognition of the customary
practices that had developed in those mining and farming communities:
that appropriators are entitled to capture and convey water for beneficial
uses; that those appropriators who are first in time have seniority in right.
Thus, even though early California miners were often trespassers, the
California Supreme Court, in Irwin v. Phillips,1 adopted prevailing
customary practices concerning water on public lands, stating that "courts
are bound to take notice of the political and social condition of the country
1. 5 Cal. 140 (1855).
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which they judicially rule."2
Americans now-particularly those in the West-are placing greater
emphasis on cultural values: the aesthetic, environmental, and recreational
importance of their waters. This change in emphasis is calling into question
the substance of established water policies and the viability of the
institutions that implement those policies. The public trust doctrine, which
requires protection of publicly important natural resources, is becoming
one vehicle for the expression of such cultural influences. This development
has been notable in California where the state supreme court recently gave
broad recognition to public rights, articulated as the public trust doctrine,
in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court (Mono Lake).3 In that
decision, the court held that water rights cannot be obtained without
reference to the public trust doctrine and that even existing water rights
4
can be reexamined under the doctrine.
Similar developments are also underway in other western states. The
North Dakota Supreme Court, for instance, has recognized the public trust
doctrine in requiring some planning before the commitment of public
resources. 5 The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized the doctrine,' and
recent litigation between Idaho and the Idaho Power Company was based
in part on the potential application of the doctrine to hydroelectric rights.7
New Mexico has relied on carefully crafted "public interest criteria" in its
permit procedure to evaluate proposals to export groundwater out of state.8
As western states in general (and for the purposes of this article,
Montana specifically) face the challenges of a major transformation of
water law based on the growing pressure to recognize broader public rights
in water, it is important to understand that the law historically adapts to
such cultural progressions. Such areas as marital and family relationships,
civil rights, and economic relationships have all seen recent changes; and
the law has adapted by recognizing "no fault" divorces, the right of
privacy, remedies for racial and sexual discrimination, rights of unionization, and by modifying rules of civil liability and the measure and extent of
damages. Because of Americans' increased concern for the protection of
natural resources and the environment, the courts have responded by

2. Id. at 146.
3. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 413 (1983).
4. Id. at 447, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365, 658 P.2d at 728.
5. United Plainsmen Ass'n. v. North Dakota State Water Conserv. Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457
(N.D. 1976).
6. Kootenai Envtl. Alliance v. State Bd. of Land Comm'rs, 105 Idaho 622, 671 P.2d 1085

(1983).
7. Idaho Power Co. v. Idaho Dep't Water Resources, No. 62237 (4th Dist. Idaho) (settled in
Oct. 1984).
8. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-3 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
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broadening standing requirements, making new use of the law of trespass
and nuisance, and filling in the details of such major statutory schemes as
the Clean Air Act.9 Water managers, legislators and courts in western
states face the challenge of integrating this new emphasis on public rights
into the longstanding system of prior appropriation.
Montana serves as an excellent case study of the difficult integration
of cultural change and an expanded concept of public rights in water into a
longstanding, traditional system of prior appropriation. California's Mono
Lake decision expressed the theoretical basis for this integration, but
Montana's experience illustrates the difficulties of achieving this integration, especially because Montana has applied the doctrine to virtually all
the waters of the state.10
Formal recognition of the public trust doctrine by the Montana
Supreme Court, at least to protect recreational uses of most of the surface
waters1 1 of the state, occurred on May 15 and June 21, 1984, in the cases of
2
Montana Coalitionfor Stream Access v. Curran1
and Montana Coalition
3
for Stream Access v. Hildreth.' Related developments have been the
contentious two-year public debate that both preceded and followed the
court's decisions and the efforts of the legislature to apply the doctrine both
to recreational uses and to broader water policy issues facing the state.
These developments are challenging the general perception of established
water rights and the extent of those rights.
This article is a limited case study of Montana's recent experience
with public rights in water, particularly with the public trust doctrine. The
article begins with a brief review of the origins and content of the public
trust doctrine. The Montana constitutional basis for public rights in water
is then examined. Thereafter, the article proceeds to trace two major
manifestations of the doctrine in Montana over the last two years: first,
attempts by the courts and the legislature to define the scope of public
recreational use of the state's waters; and second, the legislature's efforts to
frame an overall policy for the management of the state's waters in the
future. The article closes with an examination of the implications, both for
Montana and the West, that can be drawn from Montana's experience.

9. 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7642 (1982).
10. The Mono Lake decision applied the public trust doctrine to the tributaries of a navigable
body of water. Its impact may ultimately reach most California waterways on a case-by-case basis. In
contrast, the Montana Supreme Court decisions discussed in this section apply the doctrine to all of the
waters of the state which have the capability of recreational use.
1I. See infra notes 167-91 and accompanying text.
12. __
Mont.
682 P.2d 163 (May 15, 1984).
13. Mont.
684 P.2d 1088 (June 21, 1984).
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II. PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

Judicial response to increasing public use in waters has been based in
many instances on the public trust doctrine-even though the doctrine
may not have been specifically articulated. This section examines the
origin and development of the doctrine, recent applications, its major
components, and some of the difficult issues it presents.
A.

Origin and Development

1. Civil and Common Law Roots
14
The public trust doctrine has its roots in both civil and common law.
The doctrine requires a high level of care (in essence, a fiduciary
obligation) by government as it deals with the resources of "common
heritage" or of "special character" within its jurisdiction. Historically, the
doctrine has been applied to protect public uses and access to and upon
navigable waters for passage, commerce, and fisheries. 5 These roots are
important in understanding the origin and development of the doctrine, but
they do not limit its current reach. While the doctrine evolved with
reference to navigable and tidal waters (and in some instances to nonnavigable fresh waters in England) and to economic and subsistence uses,
it
6
is now being applied more frequently to other natural resources.'
The Institutes of Justinian, in restating Roman law, provided the civil
law origins of the doctrine: "By the law of nature these things are common
to man-the air, running water, the sea and consequently the shores of the
7
sea."1
The same principles were recognized in early English law; but,
because the common law rejects the concept of non-ownership, the
common property notions of the Roman law had to be adapted to allow for
public use. A solution was found, therefore, by attributing ownership to the
King or Queen-thus, "all things which relate peculiarly to the public good

14. See, e.g., Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient Prerogative Becomes the
People's Environmental Right, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 195 (1980). The interpretation of the
antecedents of the public trust doctrine that have been set forth in case law is considered overly
romantic and somewhat inaccurate by one observer. See Deveney, Title, Jus Publicumand the Public
Trust: An HistoricalAnalysis, I SEA GRANT L.J. 13 (1976).

15.

Id.

16. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Department of Interior, 376 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Sierra
Club v. Department of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Sierra Club v. Department of
Interior, 424 F.Supp. 172 (N.D. Cal. 1976). In this litigation, theSierra Cluballeged thattheNational
Park Service had the duty to prevent damage allegedly caused by logging on lands adjacent to and
upstream of Redwood National Park. See alsoWilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrinein PublicLand
Law, 14 U.C. D. L. REv. 269 (1980). See also cases cited at notes 12 & 13.

17.

INsTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN

2.1.1 (T. Cooper trans. & ed. 1841).
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cannot be given over or transferred . . . to another person, or separated
from the Crown."' 18 One author describes the English developments in this
way:
All rivers and ports were public, and the right of fishing was
common to all men. Any person was at liberty to use the seashore
to the highest tide, to build a cottage or retreat on it or to dry his
nets on it, so long as he did not interfere with use of the sea or
beach by others. Although the banks of a river were subject to
private ownership, all persons had the right to bring vessels to the
river, to fasten to them by ropes and to place any part of their
cargo there. 19
2.

American Applications

Applications of public trust considerations in America have been
made since the early days of the colonies. Massachusetts' "great pond"
ordinance20 of 1641 guaranteed rights to the fish and fowl in ponds of ten
acres or more, as well as access through private property to enjoy that right.
In enacting the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, Congress guaranteed "the
navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and the
carrying places between the same, shall be common highways, and forever
free. . ."I' The New Jersey Supreme Court in 1821 recognized that the
states had succeeded to the rights of the British Crown in publicly
important waters and their underlying beds. The court further indicated:
[T]he sovereign power itself. . cannot, consistently with the
principles of the law of nature and the constitution of a wellordered society, make a direct and absolute grant of the waters of
the state, divesting all the citizens of their common right.2 2
This same principle was recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in the
1842 case of Martinv. Waddell.2a It involved a dispute over use of an oyster
fishery located in the tidelands of New Jersey, one of the 13 original states.
The Supreme Court ruled that ownership of the land underlying tidal
waters had been an attribute of English sovereignty and that
when the Revolution took place, the people of each state became
themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute
right to all their navigable waters and the soils under them for
their own common use, subject only to the rights since surren18. 1 H. BRACTON,

ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 16-17 (S. Thorne trans. 1980).
19. Stevens, supra note 14, at 197.
20. Massachusetts Bay Colony Ordinance, Body of Liberties (1641-1647), quoted in Slater v.
Gunn, 170 Mass. 509, 49 N.E. 1017 (1898). A contemporary version of the ordinance is codified at
MASS. ANN. LAWS

21.
22.
23.

ch 131, § 45 (Michie Law. Co-op 1981).

Ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50 (1789).
Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 78 (1821).
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
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24
dered by the constitution to the general government.
Thus, when the colonies became independent, they succeeded to ownership
of the lands under tidal waters. In a dispute reaching the Supreme Court
three years later, the question arose whether such tidal land ownership
extended to states not numbering among the original 13 colonies. In
Pollard'sLessee v. Hagan,2 5 the Court ruled that states other than the
original 13 entered the Union on an "equal footing" with the original
colonies. Thus, these states, too, succeeded to ownership of the lands
underlying navigable waters and, with that ownership, succeeded to
sovereign control of those lands.
The most important. U.S. Supreme Court statement of a state's
obligation under the public trust doctrine is found in Illinois Central
Railroadv. Illinois.2" In 18 69, the Illinois legislature granted to the Illinois
Central Railroad a tract of 1,000 acres of tidal and submerged land,
representing virtually all of Chicago's Lake Michigan waterfront. The
railroad was only limited in that it could not obstruct the harbor or impair
the public's right of navigation. Also, the legislature retained the right to
regulate wharfage fees when docks were built.
Rethinking the transaction, the legislature later rescinded the grant;
and the legality of the rescission (with no more than incidental compensation) was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1892. The Court declared
that one legislature may neither "give away nor sell the discretion of its
successor" to "exercise the powers of the State" 27 in the execution of the
trust, and that legislation "which may be needed one day for the harbor
may be different from the legislation that may be required at another
day." 28 The Court indicated that "[s]uch abdication [of state control] is
not consistent with the exercise of that trust which requires the government
of the State to preserve such waters for the use of the public."2 9 The Court
did recognize, however, that some parcels on the waterfront could be
granted free of the public trust so long as they furthered trust purposes. 30
Applications of public trust considerations have been made in many
states. In Massachusetts, litigation resulted in the invalidation of excessive
delegations of authority to a private company to develop and operate a state
park and ski area. 31 In Wisconsin, a ruling invalidated legislation which

24. Id. at 410.
25. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
26. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
27. Id. at 460.

28.

Id.

29.
30.
31.

Id. at 453.
Id.
Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966).
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had authorized a private developer to drain a lake. 2 Another Wisconsin
decision prevented a local government from using a fishing stream for
electric power generation. 3 A Pennsylvania court has ruled that, where
destruction of a public resource is justified because of an overriding public
purpose, there should be reasonable efforts of mitigation.3 4 In North
Dakota, the supreme court prevented the issuance of water appropriation
permits for coal generation facilities in the absence of a comprehensive
water use plan taking into account instream uses such as navigation,
commerce, and fishing.3 5 A recent New Jersey Supreme Court decision
recognized in some instances the public's ancillary rights of both reasonable access to and use of privately owned portions of beach areas to enjoy
tidelands.3 1 In a 1983 decision noted above, the Idaho Supreme Court
recognized the public trust doctrine, but upheld the lease of an area of a
navigable lakebed by the state lands department for the construction of a
private docking facility because a fee interest was not being conveyed, and
37
the facility would serve recreational interests.
3. Mono Lake Litigation
While the public trust doctrine has been recently applied in other
states, the California Supreme Court's decision in National Audubon
Society v. SuperiorCourt (Mono Lake)38 is the most sweeping declaration
of public trust considerations. Referred by the federal district court to the
state courts for resolution of a state law issue,39 the case (decided in
February 198340 and slightly modified in April 198341) signals an important integration of the public trust doctrine with the prior appropriation
doctrine.
42
The facts of Mono Lake are the water history of Los Angeles itself.
In 1913, Los Angeles completed its first aqueduct from the Owens Valley
north of the city and eventually dried up Owens Lake. In 1933, the city

32. Priewe v. Wisconsin State Land & Improvement Co., 93 Wis. 534, 67 N.W. 918 (1896).
33. Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492,53 N.W.2d 514, affdon reh., 261 Wis. 515,
55 N.W.2d 40 (1952).
34. Paynev. Kassab, II Pa. Commw. Ct. 14, 312 A.2d 86 (1973), aft'd, 468 Pa. 226, 361 A.2d
263 (1976).
35. United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conserv. Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457
(N.D. 1976).
36. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 471 A.2d 355 (1984).
37. Kootenai Envtl. Alliance v. State Bd. of Land Comm'rs, 105 Idaho 622, 671 P.2d 1085
(1983). See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
38. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 413 (1983).
39. Id. at 432, 658 P.2d at 717, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 353-54.
40. Id. at 419, 658 P.2d at 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., KAHRL, WATER AND POWER (1982).
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applied for and in 1940 received a state permit to divert more distant
unappropriated waters in four of the five tributary streams serving Mono
Lake, lying east of Yosemite. The state water management agency
apparently knew environmental damage would occur from the granting of
the water permit, but the agency believed that it had no authority to
prevent or minimize that damage. For the next 20 years, however, Los
Angeles made little use of these waters. 3
In the early 1960's, the state warned Los Angeles that its Mono Lake
right would have to be put to use or it would be lost. By 1970, Los Angeles
completed a second aqueduct, enabling it to take its full Mono Lake
entitlement. The result was that, over the next ten years, the surface of the
lake diminished by abofit 30 percent and the surface level dropped
approximately 40 feet. The brine shrimp of the lake, upon which numerous
bird species depend, became threatened by increased salinity. Many birds,
including a large breeding colony of California gulls, lost safe habitat
because a once-protected island became connected with the main shore.
Air quality deteriorated as alkaline flats became exposed to the wind." The
pace of this environmental degradation, however, has slowed in the last few
years due to increased precipitation. In 1979, the National Audubon
Society and other plaintiffs filed an action in California state court to
enjoin the city from diversion of the tributaries on the ground that the
diversions were in conflict with the public trust doctrine's protection of the
shore, bed and waters of Mono Lake.
In its February 1983 decision, the California Supreme Court held that
the public trust doctrine applies to protect the navigable waters of Mono
Lake from harm caused by diversion of non-navigable tributaries. 5 The
court indicated that the doctrine protects evolving public needs for
ecological preservation, open spdce maintenance, and aesthetics, as well as
the traditional concerns of navigation, commerce, and fishing. The state, as
public trustee, has a continuing duty to protect the people's common
heritage of streams and lakes through continuing administration of the
trust.4 6 The courts of the state have concurrent jurisdiction with administrative agencies to exercise this duty, although the judiciary should defer to
agency expertise whenever possible.4 7 The decision may also stand for the
proposition that this continuing obligation would allow the state to revoke
existing water rights without compensation to the holder.48
43.
44.

Id. at 430-36.
As alleged in the original complaint, National Audubon Soc. v. Department of Water &

Power, No. Civ S-80 127 LKK (E.D. Cal. filed Nov. 16, 1981).

45. 33 Cal. 3d at 437, 658 P.2d at 721, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
46. Id. at 440, 658 P.2d at 723, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
47. Id. at 426, 658 P.2d at 713, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 349-50.
48.

See, e.g., Rossmann, Public Trust in Appropriated Waters: CaliforniaSupreme Court
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Read broadly, the decision indicates that water rights under California's appropriation system cannot be acquired independently of the public
trust. Water rights are never vested; they can and should be reconsidered
on the basis of public interest which includes economic uses such as
irrigation and municipal supply as well as intangible and recreation values.
The actual litigation, however, is far from over. Currently the case
continues before the U.S. District Court in Sacramento where Judge
Lawrence Karlton recently ruled that plaintiff's public trust claims, being
based on state law, will again be remanded to state court for resolution.4 9
B.

Components of the Doctrine

1. Legal Basis
The basis of the public trust doctrine is not clearly common,
constitutional, or statutory law. The common law origins of the doctrine
have been previously reviewed.5 0 In addition, there are many examples of
western states giving constitutional recognition to public rights in waters.
For instance, several states provide that water is the "property" of the
people. 5' Other state constitutions provide that water "belongs to" the
people. 2 A third group affirms that a water use is a "public use" subject to
53
state control and regulation.
Arguably, these provisions incorporate public trust concerns, and they
have provided the basis for statutory provisions requiring state water
agencies to consider environmental values in water permit applications and
to retain jurisdiction over the permits. For instance, the California Water
Resources Control Board is required to consider recreational, aesthetic,
fish and wildlife, and other environmental values in reviewing permit
applications,5 4 and the board must specifically find that the proposed use is
consistent with the public interest in view of all competing needs. 55
Similarly, for the last two years, Montana has applied "public interest

Decides Mono Lake Case, WNRL COMMENTARY 13 (Spring 1983).
49. In a recent decision on motions for summary judgment, Judge Karlton has ruled that: (1)
plaintiffs state a federal common law nuisance action in alleging interstate air pollution from the
alkaline flats exposed as a result of Los Angeles' water diversions; (2) the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §
1251-1376 (1982), preempts plaintiff's federal common law action based on damage to the lake's biota
brought about by increased salinity; and (3) plaintiff's public trust claims, being based on state law,will
again be remanded to state court for resolution. National Audubon Soc. v. Department of Water &
Power, No. Civ S-80 127 LKK (E.D. Cal. filed Nov. 11, 1981).
50. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
51. E.g., California, Colorado, and South Dakota.
52. E.g., Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico, and Oregon.
53. E.g., Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming.
54.

CAL. WATER CODE § 1243 (West Supp. 1985).

55.

Id.
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criteria" to new permit applications on a temporary basis. 56 In addition to
being justified by the public trust doctrine, the use of such provisions has
been upheld as a valid exercise of state police power-even when applied to
modify existing water rights.57
The public trust doctrine apparently is not displaced by such constitutional and statutory affirmations, and it appears that the doctrine exists
independently of such provisions. As one author has indicated, "the public
trust doctrine appears to be an expression of the inherent prerogative of the
sovereign to restrict or reallocate property rights to protect the integrity of
the 'special' or 'common heritage' natural resource."'5 8 With reference to
the Mono Lake decision, another commentator stated:
The [California Supreme] Court could have held that the water
rights laws require consideration of environmental values. Instead, the Court held that this obligation is imposed by the public
trust doctrine, and that the water right laws are essentially
irrelevant for this purpose. But if the people have adopted a
constitutional water rights system, it would seem that the state's
responsibilities for water allocations must be measured by the
water rights system itself, not by the common law principles of
the public trust doctrine. The usual rule is that constitutional
law
59
displaces the common law, not the other way around.
Thus, there is some indication that the public trust doctrine is not
simply common, constitutional, or statutory law.60 Early American cases
imply that state authority over certain publicly important waters and
adjacent lands is an integral element of sovereignty. Some authorities
justify the doctrine on the basis of the universal and elemental importance
of water.6" Still other authorities indicate that the public trust doctrine is
fundamental to the Anglo-American legal system: "to protect.

. .

public

expectations [as to important natural resources] against destabilizing
changes, just as we protect conventional private property from such
changes."6 2 These interpretations indicate that the doctrine may be extra-

56. MoNr. CODE ANN. § 85-2-311 (1983). These criteria require an examination of potential
effects of the proposed use on present and future water supply, instream flows, water quality, saline
seep, and other environmental values. These considerations were modified and made permanent by the
1985 legislature. 1985 Mont. Laws ch. 573. See infra notes 225-39 and accompanying text.
57. In re Guadalupe River Basin, 642 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. 1982).
58. Dunning, The Mono Lake Diversion:Protectinga Common HeritageResourcefrom Death
by Diversion, 13 ENVTL. L. REV. 10144, 10147 (May 1984).
59. Presentation of Roderick E. Walston, Cal. Deputy Attorney Gen., before Am. Bar Ass'n

Natural Resources Section (Jan. 8, 1985).
60.

Dunning, supranote 58, at 10146: Thedoctrine "expresses an inherent aspect ofsovereignty,

and thus is in some ways beyond modification by the legislature."
61.
62.

See, e.g., Stevens, supra note 14, at 231.
Sax, Liberatingthe PublicTrustDoctrinefromItsHistoricalShackles, 14 U.C. D. L. REv.

185, 188 (1980).
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constitutional. In that case, neither a state constitution or statute could
immunize the purported absolute conveyance of publicly important waters
or other "common heritage" natural resources from subsequent judicial
63
reexamination.
2.

Navigability Requirement

The public trust doctrine has been linked from its origin to navigable
and tidal waters. That linkage, complicated by the use of the navigability
concept for other purposes, has resulted in a confusing set of principles and
sometimes has masked the underlying public policy need. Even though the
doctrine seems to be moving beyond the need for strict adherence to a
navigability requirement, this original linkage should be understood.
The concept of "navigability" with reference to a waterway generally
is used for one of three purposes:
(1) to determine title to the streambed;
(2) to justify the exercise of federal authority over the
waterway; or
(3) to determine, through application of the public trust
and similar concepts, the rights of the public to use the surface of
the water, the streambed, and the land adjacent to the waterway
for recreational and other public purposes.
In the previously discussed case of Martin v. Waddell, the U.S.
Supreme Court determined that the 13 original states, rather than the
federal government, succeeded to the British Crown's title to tidelands and
the foreshore. In Pollard'sLessee v. Hagan,6 4 the Court held that each new
state also took title to the streambeds of navigable waters. Thus, with the
exception of any pre-statehood land grants specifically passing title to the
grantee (an interpretation which is disfavored by the courts), states hold
title to the lands beneath the navigable waters.
The standard for determining navigability was set forth in the 1870
U.S. Supreme Court decision, The Daniel Ball 5 as being waters "used or
• . .susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for
commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted ... "I'
The characteristics of a waterway at the time of statehood are determinative in a test for title, whether or not it was used for commerce at the time.
"Navigability" is also used to determine the scope of the congressional
commerce power over the nation's waters. 67 Congress' power under the

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See infra notes 73 to 106 and accompanying text.
44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845). See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
Id. at 563.
U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8.
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Commerce Clause has been broadly construed; and, in certain cases, the
waterway need only "have an 'effect' upon interstate commerce."6 8 Thus,
the non-navigable tributaries of waters supporting interstate commerce
may fall under federal control. Navigability for commerce may arise after
statehood; and waterways may be made "susceptible" to navigation with
reasonable improvements.
Finally, navigability is also used to determine recreational and other
uses. 9 Unlike the previous two applications, "navigability" for determining these uses is a state law question. Some states have used a "pleasure
boat" test.70 Others, like Montana, 71 have passed specific "angling"
statutes to define public recreational rights to the states' waters. Recently
the Montana Supreme Court has held: "The capability of use of the waters
for recreational purposes determines their availability for recreational use
by the public."'7 2 This holding avoids defining navigability and it provides
little guidance on what recreational uses are permissible.
While the public trust doctrine has most often been linked from its
origins to navigable and tidal waters, recent holdings such as Mono Lake
seem to indicate that navigability is simply an indicator for a more
important and basic concern: Is the resource vested with major public
importance? If so, the courts appear ready to strain to apply public trust
protection even though the linkage to navigability may be tenuous. In
Mono Lake, the court applied the doctrine because diversions from nonnavigable tributaries affected the navigable lake. Thus, it would not be
surprising to see the navigability requirement dropped entirely by the
courts in favor of a more accurate and focused examination of the extent of
the public's interest in the continued use of a resource.
3.

Legislative Authority

An important aspect of the public trust doctrine, its apparent
precedence over statutory law, 3 leads to the question of legislative
authority within the parameters of the doctrine.

68. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D. D.C. 1975); see also
Leighty, The Source andScope ofPublicandPrivateRightsin Navigable Waters, 5 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 391, 427 (1970).
69. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 37.4(A) (Clark ed. 1967); see generally, Comment,
RecreationalUse of Montana's Waterways: An Analysis of PublicRights, 3 PUBLIC LAND L. REV.
133 (1982); Stone, The Background on RecreationalUse of Montana Water, 32 MONT. L. REV. 1

(1971).
70.

Lamprey v. State (Metcalf), 52 Minn. 181, 53 N.W. 1139 (1893).

71.

MONT: CODE ANN.

72.

Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Curran,.

§ 87-2-305 (1983).

15, 1984). See infra notes 167-91 and accompanying text.
73.

See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.

Mont..._., 682 P.2d 163,170 (May
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The public trust doctrine encompasses legislative authority to make
decisions necessary to the wise management of the trust. There are basic
elements of the doctrine to which the states and their legislatures must
adhere, but the legislatures do retain substantial authority within the
74
doctrine. The legislature has an affirmative duty to preserve the trust.
What the legislature cannot do is relinquish governmental control over the
trust;7 5 it may not be "placed entirely beyond the direction and control of
the state."'76 Regulation of the trust for the benefit of the citizens is an
aspect of governmental sovereignty that the legislature is not empowered
to annul.7 7

The public trust doctrine is not static. 78 Enforcement of the trust
requires a balancing and accommodation of sometimes conflicting public
interests. The pressures of a changing world have resulted in decisions
altering and expanding the areas and uses protected by the trust,7 9 but the
outer limits of the doctrine remain unchanged." The people's common
right in the trust may not be absolutely conveyed free of the trust to a
private entity except when the conveyance itself serves a public purpose or

when the conveyance does not impair the property remaining in trust.
Legislative action that appears to impair or extinguish the trust will be

74. Milwaukee v. Wisconsin, 193 Wis. 423, 214 N.W. 820 (1927). See also Ashwaubenon v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 22 Wis. 2d 38, 125 N.W.2d 647 (1963).
75. Exceptions to this general rule are: a conveyance of public trust property for a public trust
purpose or a conveyance of public trust property that can be made without damaging the remaining
trust property. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 455-56 (1892), Appleby v. City of New
York, 271 U.S. 364, 393-396 (1926).
76. Illinois Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 454.
77. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J. L.] (1821). Case law indicates, however, that there may be
instances in which a conveyance for a purely private purpose may be authorized. In Opinion of the
Justices, the court stated, "Our conclusion is simply that the transfer or relinquishment of all the
Commonwealth's and the public's rights in tidelands is not constitutionally beyond the power of the
Legislature . . . .although a gross or egregious disregard of the public interest would not survive
constitutional challenge." 424 N.E.2d 1092, 1099 (Mass. 1981) (footnote omitted). It is not well
settled what conveyances of trust property are egregious or would result "in such substantial
impairment of the public's interest as would be beyond the power of the legislature to authorize." Morse
v. Division of State Lands, 285 Or. 197, 203, 590 P.2d 709, 712 (1979). In fact, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court recently ruled in Appeal of Committee, 466 A.2d 1308 (N.H. 1983), that there are no
such conveyances. The question may be a matter for legislative determination, but it is beyond the scope
of an overview of legislative authority in this area.
78. Neptune City v. Avon-By-The-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47 (1972).
79. See National Audubon Soc. v. Superior Court (Mono Lake), 33 Cal. 3d 419,658 P.2d 709,
189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cert denied, 104 S.Ct. 413 (1983), Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251,491 P.2d 374,
98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971); but see Bott v. Comm'n of Natural Resources, 415 Mich. 45, 327 N.W.2d
838 (1982).
80. "Thus, the public trust is more than an affirmation of state power to use public property for
public purposes. It is an affirmation of the duty of the state to protect the people's common heritage of
streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands, surrendering that right of protection only in rare cases when
the abandonment of that right is consistent with the purposes of the trust." Mono Lake, 33 Cal. 3d at
441, 658 P.2d at 724, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 360-61.
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carefully examined by a reviewing court.8
a.

Contours of Legislative Activity

In formulating its approach to the implementation of the public trust
doctrine in Montana, the legislature may look at the experiences of other

jurisdictions that have a longer history of explicit recognition of the
doctrine. Not surprisingly, a number of the cases review a particular

legislative action that has been challenged or questioned as being in
violation of the public trust doctrine. Grounding their decisions on Illinois
CentralRailroadv. Illinois,82 courts regularly apply, among others, three

concepts: (1) legislative enactments affecting the public trust must be for a
public purpose; (2) no single interest in the use of the trust is absolute; and
(3) legislative enactments affecting the trust will be carefully scrutinized.
(i) Public purpose
It is generally agreed that legislative enactments affecting or impair-

ing the public trust must be for a public purpose.8 Legislatures have been
given considerable latitude in their determinations of the existence of or
manner of implementation of a public purpose even though these determinations are subject to careful scrutiny by the courts. Property in the public
trust cannot be absolutely conveyed for a private purpose. a4 Yet, convey-

ances that benefit private individuals have been upheld when a related
public benefit is found.8 5 In California, legislation authorizing the conveyance of tidelands to private parties without consideration of the public trust
81. See infra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
82. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
83. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 37.4(A) (Clark ed. 1967). Traditionally, it has been
required that public trust property be held for particular water-related purposes, i.e., navigation,
commerce and fishing but the permissible uses of trust property have been expanded in many instances.
See generally Stevens, supra note 14, at 201-223. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
84. See People ex rel. Scott v. Chicago Park Dist., 66 Ill.2d 65, 360 N.E.2d 773 (1976)
(invalidated a grant to a private steel company of submerged lands beneath Lake Michigan).
85. See People ex rel. Moloney v. Kirk, 162111. 138,45 N.E. 830 (1897) (upheld filling in portion
of Lake Michigan for extension of Chicago's Lake Shore Drive and sale of reclaimed land between
highway and shore to defray costs of highway since road provided direct public benefit and the project
caused only limited impairment of navigation and fishing); Milwaukee v. State, 193 Wis. 423, 214
N.W. 820 (1927) (state's authorization to city to convey a portion of bed of navigable lake to private
steel company upheld when conveyance was part of city plan to improve harbor); New Jersey Sports &
Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 61 N.J. 1, 292 A.2d 545 (1972), affg asmod. 119 N.J. Super. 457,292
A.ld 580, 615-622 (1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 943 (1972) (legislative authorization of
conveyance of land, including tidelands, for sports complex and racetrack found not in violation of
public trust doctrine since conveyance would promote public purpose and proceeds of conveyance
would be used for public schools); Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597 (Me. 1981) (advisory opinion
to governor on bill awaiting his signature found release of state ownership of filled submerged and
intertidal lands to private adjacent owners valid promotion of public interest in commercial
development through clearing up uncertainty of title).
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has been construed as a conveyance of the land subject to a public easement
which cannot be interfered with by the grantee or his successors in
interest.88
Similar results have been reached in Massachusetts.8 7 In 1979, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled in Boston Waterfront
Development Corp. v. Commonwealth8 8 that a parcel of filled land in the
Boston Harbor, situated at the end of a wharf built pursuant to a nineteenth
century statutory grant, was owned by the successors in interest of the
original grantees "in fee simple, but subject to the condition subsequent
' This case
that it be used for the public purpose for which it was granted."89
illustrates a problem faced by courts when they must interpret longstanding legislation that has created certain expectations in property
owners.
An interesting accommodation of various interests was made by the
California Supreme Court in City of Berkeley v. Superior Court,9 0 a case
involving interpretation of very old conveyances of tidelands. The balancing in this case was done by the California Supreme Court, not the
California legislature, but it illustrates the demands that may be placed on
a legislature. The case involved a dispute over ownership of tidelands on the
shore of San Francisco Bay. In the 1870's, the tidelands had been granted
to private parties free of the public trust by a state land board under
legislative authorization. The supreme court, overruling two earlier
cases, 91 ruled that the grants had been made subject to the public trust. The
difficulty in the case was whether or not to make the decision retroactive,
since some of the tidelands had been filled or improved by their owners. The
court ruled that properties that had been filled, whether or not they had
been substantially improved, are free of the trust to the extent they are not
subject to tidal action. But with respect to lands that had been neither filled
nor improved, the court ruled that since they are the lands most suitable for
the continued exercise of trust uses and because there is only a remote
likelihood that the parcels may be filled, these lands are subject to the trust.

86. People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913); Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d
251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971). But see Summa Corp. v. California, 104 S. Ct. 1751
(1984) in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that California's failure to assert an interest in tidelands
that were the subject of federal patent proceedings after the Mexican-American War barred the state
from later asserting a public trust easement over the property.
87. See Butler v. Attorney General, 195 Mass. 79,84,80 N.E. 688 (1907); Michaelson v. Silver
Beach Improvement Ass'n, 342 Mass. 251, 173 N.E.2d 273 (1961); Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v.
Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 629, 393 N.E.2d 356 (1979).
88. 378 Mass. 629, 393 N.E.2d 356 (1979).
89. Id. at 649, 393 N.E.2d at 367 (footnote omitted).
90. 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 361. 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980).
91. Knudson v. Kearney, 171 Cal. 250, 152 P. 541 (1915); Alameda Conserv. Ass'n v. City of
Alameda, 264 Cal. App. 2d 284, 70 Cal. Rptr. 264 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 906 (1969).
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The court reasoned that the economic loss to the grantees of these parcels
was speculative at best and was clearly outweighed by the interests of the
public. 2
(ii)

No single purpose

Often, the legislature must also balance competing and sometimes
conflicting trust purposes. A 1911 case in Wisconsin addressed this issue.
In re Trempealeau DrainageDistrict" involved the validity of an act
authorizing a project to drain 7000 acres of bottomland along the
Mississippi River and to alter the course of a river. The court upheld the
proposal, finding that the drainage project would alleviate unsanitary
conditions in an area of a swamp and marshland and that it would improve
navigation by straightening the Trempealeau River. The court recognized
that the project would have an adverse effect on fishing and hunting, but
held that this negative impact was minimal and had to yield to the greater
public interests involved. 94
Filling in estuarial waters for the purposes of extending an airport
runway was held consistent with the public trust doctrine in Oregon,
perhaps in part because the land to be filled had supported only "very
casual navigation of the recreational kind."" 5 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court ruled a statute restricting to riparian landowners eligibility for a
permit to construct a water ski jump on a navigable lake not violative of the
public trust doctrine because a permit could only be granted if the structure
would not interfere with navigation or be otherwise detrimental to the
public interest.96
A related legislative determination made in the area of conflicting
purposes is whether the use of public trust property should be altered. Here
too, a balancing must be made of the existing public use against the new
use, which must be for a public purpose.9 7 In Massachusetts, when the type
of use for which public land is needed changes over time, very specific
92. 26 Cal. 3d at 338-39, 606 P.2d at 373-74, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 338-39.
93. 146 Wis. 398, 131 N.W. 838 (1911). See also In re Crawford County Levee & Drainage
Dist. No. 1, 182 Wis. 404, 196 N.W. 874 (1924).

94. 146 Wis. at 410, 131 N.W. at 841-42.
95. Morse v. Division of State Lands, 285 Or. 197, 200, 590 P.2d 709, 711 (1979). The permit
was ruled invalidly issued on other grounds.
96. State v. Bleck, 114 Wis. 2d 454, 338 N.W.2d 492 (1983). See also Wisconsin v. Village of
Lake Delton, 93 Wis. 2d 78, 286 N.W.2d 622 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979).
97. See Madison v. State, 1 Wis. 2d 252, 83 N.W.2d 674 (1957) (city allowed to build

auditorium and civic center on previously filled portion of navigable lake); Paepke v. Public Bldg.
Comm'n, 46 III. 2d 330, 263 N.E.2d 11 (1970) (city allowed to use portion of land dedicated to park
purpose for use for construction of school); Wadev. Kramer, 121111. 3d 377,459 N.E.2d 1025 (1984)

(was proper for State Department of Transportation, under legislative authorization, to build highway
through county conservation area).
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legislative approval of the change is required. 98
(iii)

Careful judicial scrutiny

Courts have seriously reviewed the legislative enactments affecting
public trust property. Recognizing that it is in the domain of the legislature
to determine whether or not a particular action serves a public purpose and
that a legislative decision in this area is entitled to deference, the courts
have ruled that the decision is not beyond judicial scrutiny. 9 Thus, in
Priewe v. Wisconsin State Land and Improvement Co., the Wisconsin
Supreme Court invalidated an act authorizing drainage of a navigable lake
even though the act was purportedly for a public purpose, stating "the
legislature had no power, under the guise of legislating for the public
health, to authorize the destruction of the lake. . . for private purposes
and for the sole benefit of private parties."' 00 The Illinois Supreme Court
has stated that, while ordinarily it is for the legislature to decide what is a
public purpose, the "self-serving recitation of a public purpose within a
legislative enactment is not conclusive of the existence of such purpose."''
As previously stated, in California, conveyances of trust property to
private individuals not made for trust purposes do not pass title to the
property free of the trust but are instead subject to a public easement. To be
effective, the legislative intention to abandon such public uses must be
clearly expressed in the statute; and if any interpretation of the statute is
reasonably possible that would not terminate a trust use, the courts will
1 2
give it that interpretation.
According to Professor Joseph Sax of the University of Michigan, this
careful scrutiny by courts can have the beneficial effect of opening up the
legislative decisionmaking process to the people whose resources are
affected by those decisions.'0 3
Legislative authority in the public trust area can be delegated to an
administrative agency, 104 but any action taken by an administrative
05
agency is subject to even closer scrutiny than is legislative action.

98. See Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966);
Robbins v. Department of Pub. Works, 355 Mass. 328, 330, 244 N.E.2d 577, 579 (1969).
99. Opinion of Justices, 383 Mass. 895,424 N.E.2d 1092 (1981). See also Blakely v. Gorin, 365
Mass 590, 313 N.E.2d 903 (1974).
100. 93 Wis. 534,67 N.W. 918 (1896), a fl'd on rehearing,103 Wis. 537,79 N.W. 780 (1899).
101. People ex rel. City of Salem v. McMackin, 53 I11.2d 347, 291 N.E.2d 807, 812 (1972).
102. People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79, 88 (1913).
103. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective JudicialIntervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471 (1970).
104. Kootenai Envt'l Alliance v. State Bd. of Land Comm'rs, 105 Idaho 622, 671 P.2d 1085
(1983).
105. Id. at 628, 671 P.2d at 1091.
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Future Legislative Decisionmaking

Of the three areas emphasized in this section, perhaps the second, (no
public trust purpose is absolute) is the most demanding for legislators. The
first area, the public purpose requirement, is not so complex, and the third,
the review of the judiciary, is but a check. The difficult task for the future is
weighing the competing interests of individuals and groups against the
backdrop of the public trust doctrine.10 6
The public trust doctrine has been applied to various situations and
government decisions. The cases indicate that beyond the basic prohibitions of unrestrained alienation of public trust property or total disregard
of public trust principles, the public trust doctrine is a vehicle for
considering the public interest in decisions affecting property held for
public use. Although the legislature must consider public trust principles,
the weight given to public values and interests is largely reflective of
societal values and is a policy determination within the proper domain of
the legislature.
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR PUBLIC RIGHTS IN MONTANA'S

WATERS

The adoption in 1972 of a new Montana constitution provided an
opportunity for the state's citizens to re-examine their relationship to their
natural resources and the environment. Discussions of public rights and the
public trust doctrine occupied part of the review. While specific incorporation of the public trust doctrine was ultimately rejected by the constitutional convention delegates, an increased public interest was recognized
generally with reference to the environment' 0 7 and specifically with
reference to water.' 08 This section reviews the convention's consideration
of the public trust doctrine as well as the water policy provisions which were
ultimately approved by the voters and which provide the constitutional
basis for public rights in Montana's waters.

106. For an interesting discussion of issues involved in application of the public trust doctrine in
an appropriative water rights setting, see Johnson, PublicTrust ProtectionforStream FlowsandLake
Levels, 14 U.C. D. L. REv. 233 (1980).
107. MONT. CONsT. art. IX, § I provides:
Protection and improvement. (1) The state and each person shall maintain and improve a
clean and healthful environment in Montana for present and future generations.
(2) The legislature shall provide for the administration and enforcement of this duty.
(3) The legislature shall provide adequate remedies for the protection of the
environmental life support system from degradation and provide adequate remedies to
prevent unreasonable depletion and degradation of natural resources.
108. Id. at art. IX, § 3.
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Public Trust Debate

During the 1971-72 Montana Constitutional Convention, the Natural Resources and Agriculture Committee considered two public trust
proposals for the constitutional article on the environment. Proposal 12
declared the "environmental life support system upon which the health and
welfare of the people. . . [depend]" to be a public trust for present and
future generations. 109 Proposal 162 declared a public trust for "all aspects
of environmental quality including, but not limited to, air, water, land,
wildlife, minerals, forests, and open space" for the benefit of the citizens. 110
The committee rejected both proposals because:
The majority felt it unnecessary to have the state hold in trust all
land, including of course privately owned real property, for the
benefit of all the people of the state in order to accomplish the
protection of our environment. In addition the majority felt it
unwise to experiment by incorporating into the Constitution a
"Public Trust" which was not clearly defined to the committee,
which is not contained in the Constitution of any other state, and
which exists in its infancy in only two states by legislation."'
The entire convention discussed the public trust doctrine in considering a proposed amendment to the report of the Natural Resources and
Agriculture Committee. The amendment read:
The State of Montana shall maintain and enhance a clean and
healthful environment as a public trust. The sole beneficiary of
the trust shall be the citizens of Montana, who shall have the duty
to maintain and enhance the trust, and the right to protect and
enforce it by appropriate legal proceedings against the
trustees." 2
A long debate occurred before the amendment was finally rejected by
a vote of 58-34.111 Supporters of the amendment urged that its adoption
would make the best statement about the convention's seriousness in
addressing environmental concerns. Utilizing the public trust doctrine,
citizens would be able to enforce the trust in suits against the state, and
thereby assist government agencies' work toward a clean and healthful
environment."14 Delegates speaking in opposition to the amendment
stressed that:
(1) the public trust concept would extend to all lands in
109. 1Transcript, MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 96 (1971-72) [hereinafter cited
as MONT. CONST. CONV.]
110. 1 MONT. CONST. CONY. 308-09.
Ill. 2 MONT. CONST. CONY. 555.
112. The text of the amendment, introduced by Delegate Jerome J. Cate of Yellowstone County,
appears at 5 MONT. CONST. CONY. 1214.
113. Id. at 1228.
114. Id.at 1215, 1217-18, 1221.
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Montana and thus there would be an infringement of private
property rights;" 5
(2) while a constitutional article should address the protection of the environment, flexibility in implementation was
needed, and legislative action was preferable to the constitutional
adoption of the public trust doctrine;"'
(3) including a constitutional provision on the public trust
doctrine would mean that courts would determine the meaning
and application of the doctrine, and the legislature
would be
117
unable to alter the judiciary's interpretation;
(4) the public trust doctrine was not clearly understood; it
was much maligned, and it would be better to state the convention's purposes and policy regarding the environment in different
words." 8
The convention did not consider applying the public trust doctrine
specifically to the waters of the state. In at least two instances, however, in
discussing the application of the doctrine in the broader context of
environmental protection, delegates suggested that they were aware that
the constitutional provision on water proposed to the convention would
place the waters of the state in public trust." 9
B.

Water Policy Provisions

The importance of the appropriation system to Montanans is clear
from its treatment in Montana's 1889 Constitution. Midway in Article III,
the constitution's declaration of rights, section 15 states:
The use of all water now appropriated, or that may hereafter be
appropriated for sale, rental, distribution, or other beneficial use,
and the right of way over the lands of others, for all ditches,
drains, flumes, canals, and aqueducts, necessarily used in connection therewith, as well as sites for reservoirs necessary for
collecting and storing the same, shall be held to be a public use.'2 0
When Montana's constitution was rewritten in 1972, the use of the
state's water commanded close attention and caused spirited debate.
Agreement was readily reached on an initial provision in the water rights
section of Article IX, "Environment and Natural Resources," recognizing
and confirming all existing rights to the use of any waters for any useful or

115. Id. at 1214, 1216-17.
116. Id. at 1223 (part of an extended argument by Geoffrey L. Brazier, delegate from
Broadwater, Jefferson, and Lewis and Clark Counties).
117. Id. at 1225.
118. See the statement of Dorothy Eck, delegate from Gallatin and Park Counties at 5 MONT.
CONST. CONV. 1221-22.
119. 5 MONT. CONST. CONY. 1215.
120. MONT. CONST. OF 1889, art. III, § 15.
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beneficial purpose.1 2 1
The water rights section next carried forward the statement on
appropriation rights, substantially as it appeared in the 1889 constitution. 2 2 Convention delegates also accepted the proposal from the Natural
Resources and Agriculture Committee that clearly stated the interests of
the people of the state in Montana's waters. Crucial to Montana constitutional law governing water rights since 1972 is this declaration in Article
IX, section 3, subsection 3:
All surface, underground, flood, and atmospheric waters within
the boundaries of the state are the property of the state for the use
of its people and are subject to appropriation for beneficial uses as
provided by law.' 2 3
The primary underlying rationale for a clear statement of Montana's
property rights in water was to strengthen the state's claims in relation to
downstream states. 2 4 It was suggested in debate that it would be sufficient
to declare that the water belonged to the state, and an unsuccessful
amendment was proposed to delete the phrase, "for the use of its people,"
and to declare:
Waters within the boundaries of the State of Montana are
declared to be the property of the state and subject to appropria125
tion for beneficial uses as provided by law.
Debate related to recreational rights and to the impact of constitutional language on strengthening Montana's claims to water in litigation
with other states or with the federal government. Strong statements in
support of the subsection were made by Miles Romney, delegate from
Ravalli County, and Ben E. Berg, Jr., delegate from Gallatin and Park
Counties. Delegate Romney spoke of stockwatering and recreational
interests:
I'd like to see the stockmen have a right to water their stock, and
I'd like to see people who wish to fish and boat use our streams. I
think that the water is the water of the people. I don't think you
can say that it belongs to the state and doesn't belong to the
people. And, my goodness, if the people can't use what belongs to
their state, this is a mockery, a travesty ... 12
Delegate Berg also urged that the convention adopt the subsection as
proposed by the committee, because it had a great deal to say about the

121. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3(1); 5 MONT. CONST. CONy. 1302-03.
122. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3(2); 5 MONT. CONST. CONY. 1303.
123. MONT. CONsT. art. IX, § 3(3).
124. See the statement of Delegate Charles B. McNeil of Lake County at 5 MONT. CONST.
CONy. 1301, 1304.
125. The amendment was proposed by Cedor B. Aronow, delegate from Teton, Glacier, Toole,
and Pondera Counties. 5 MONT. CONST. CONy. 1303.
126. 5 MONT. CONST. CONy. 1306.
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character of the ownership of water in Montana. He argued that it would
be erroneous to state that Montana owns the water without reference to the
rights of the people to use the water. He feared that if the constitution
merely provided that the state owned the water, the state could negotiate
for the sale of the water. The section as proposed was important because if
the state were the trustee of water for the use and benefit of the people, it
could not enter into negotiations and sale of water without the consent and
approval of its beneficiary, the people. 2 7 Berg emphasized that the phrase,
"for the use of its people," reinstated the theory under which water had
always been administered in Montana because "water rights are never
owned; nobody owns water. All that you ever acquire is the right to the use
28
of the water."'
Fear was expressed that if the constitution stated that the water
belonged to the people, the people could not be kept from it and they would
assume they had access across private lands to reach the waters. 129 Other
delegates stressed, however, that access rights across private lands were not
implied by the proposed subsection and the convention voted down an
amendment related to trespass. 30 When a final vote was taken, there was
unanimous agreement on subsection 3 as it originally was proposed by the
13
Natural Resources and Agriculture Committee. '
Two committee proposals did not fare as well, and the convention's
most prolonged water rights debate was directed to a provision that would
have detailed beneficial uses for the state's waters and specified that
diversions or developments would not be necessary to acquire a water right.
The recommended subsection stated:
Beneficial uses include, but are not limited to, domestic, municipal, agriculture, stockwatering, industry, recreation, scenic waterways, and habitat for wildlife, and all other uses presently
recognized by law, together with future beneficial uses as
determined by the legislature or courts of Montana. A diversion.
or development work is not required for future acquisition of a
water right for the foregoing uses. The legislature shall determine the method of establishing those future water rights which
do not require a diversion and may designate priorities for those
future rights if necessary. 3 2
In proposing the subsection, Delegate Charles B. McNeil of Lake

127. Id. at 1308.
128. Id.
129. See statement of Delegate Aronow at 5 MONT. CONST. CONY. 1304.
130. 5 MONT. CONST. CONY. 1310.
131. Id. at 1312.
132. Proposal of the Natural Resources & Agriculture Comm., 2 MoT. CONST. CONV. 552; 5
MONT. CONST. CONY. 1312.
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County emphasized that its adoption was in the best interests of the people
of the state because it would permit Montana to claim a use for all of its
water presently flowing out of the state. He noted that the determination of
methods for establishing water rights without a diversion and the designation of priorities for those rights were purposely left to the legislature so
that "recreation and the traditional water users can live together for our
future water rights." 133
The debate on the proposal prompted amendments specifying that
water rights established without a diversion would be junior and
subordinate to traditional appropriations.' A strong argument was made
that agricultural use of water by diversion must under all circumstances
have a superior right to recreation, scenic waterways, and habitat for
wildlife.' 35 Others warned that adoption of the proposal would halt further
3
irrigation projects and future economic development in Montana.1 1
Counter arguments predicted that recreation might be Montana's principal industry in the future.13 7 Ultimately, the convention delegates entirely
deleted the proposed subsection. Important to their decision were arguments that the provision was statutory in nature, and that specific
3
beneficial uses and priorities were matters best left to the legislature. 1
The same rationale led to the defeat of a proposed subsection stating that
39
priority of appropriation would give the better right.
A final subsection proposed by the Natural Resources and Agriculture Committee stated:
The Legislature shall provide for the administration, control and
regulation of water 40 rights and shall establish a system of
centralized records.
Continuity with traditional practices prevailed when convention delegates
successfully appended to the subsection language perpetuating the existing
system of local records in addition to the system of centralized records. 4 '
From an overall perspective, the water rights section of the 1972
Montana Constitution can be viewed as drawing on past experience and
pointing to the future. There is protection for existing rights and a

133. 5 MONT. CoNsT. CONY. 1312.
134. The amendments were proposed by Archie 0. Wilson, delegate from Garfield, Rosebud,
McCone, Prairie and Treasure Counties, and by Carl M. Davis, delegate from Madison and
Beaverhead Counties. 5 MONT. CONST. CONY. 1313, 1322-23.
135. See the statement of Delegate Ben E. Berg, Jr., of Gallatin and Park Counties at 5 MONT.
CONST. CONy. 1327.
136. 5 MONT. CoNsT. CONv. 1314, 1317.
137. Id. at 1332.
138. Id. at 1334-35, 1339-40, 1342-43.
139. Id. at 1346-48.
140. Id. at 1349.
141. Id. at 1350-51.
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restatement of the right of appropriation. There is express authorization
for the legislature to regulate and administer water rights. There is a
declaration that the waters of the state are the property of the state for the
use of its people. In making the declaration, the convention delegates
opened the way for judicial interpretation and legislative implementation
of new fundamental law relating to water rights.

IV.

FORGING PUBLIC RIGHTS IN MONTANA'S WATERS

By the early 1980's, increased applications of the public trust doctrine
in other states, coupled with the 1972 constitution, provided the context for
Montana to recognize, expand and enforce public rights in waters. Over
the last two years, Montana has struggled with the question of public rights
in waters in two different circumstances. The first of these, which resulted
in judicial recognition of (and legislative response to) the public trust
doctrine, involved public access to the streams and lakes of the state for
recreational purposes. The second instance concerned the legislature's
efforts to incorporate public trust considerations into a substantial restatement of Montana water law. The following sections trace each of these
struggles.
A.

Stream Access

Montanans' recreational use of the state's waters has dramatically
increased in recent years. For instance, recent studies by the Montana
Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks indicate that the Missouri River
and its tributaries were fished a total of 1.4 million fishing days in the 198283 season; and fishing in other parts of the state equaled that amount.
Usage by other recreationists, including canoeists and other "floaters," has
significantly increased.142 Waters of the Yellowstone River have been
reserved for instream as well as other uses under the state's water
reservation system, and efforts are underway to reserve waters on the
mainstem and tributaries of the Missouri. 43 In these and other ways, the
people, with support from the state, have exercised more contemporary
uses of the waters.
Increased public uses have not been easily accepted in some parts of
the state. In particular, conflicts between floaters and adjoining landowners have been intense on two waterways: the Dearborn and the Beaverhead
Rivers. Some landowners feared that recreational users would litter the
rivers and the banks, trespass on private property, interfere with livestock,
and damage fences and other structures. Some landowners believed that
142. Telephone interview with Mont. Dep't Fish, Wildlife & Parks (Mar. 26, 1985).
143. 1985 Mont. Laws ch. 573

PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6

the public had no right to be on streams considered non-navigable.144 Many
recreationists, however, maintained that they were simply exercising
rights guaranteed to them under the state constitution: that the waters of
the state are the property of the state for the use of its people.145 These
conflicts resulted in the filing of two cases by a group of recreational users,
the Montana Coalition for Stream Access.
I.

Curran and Hildreth: Trial Court Proceedings

46
In the first case, Montana Coalitionfor Stream Access v. Curran,1
the First Judicial District Court found three statutory grounds for the
public access to the Dearborn River claimed by the recreationists: (1)
Montana Code Annotated Section 87-2-305, declaring navigable rivers,
sloughs and streams to be public waters for the purpose of angling; (2)
Section 85-1-112, providing that all rivers and streams which are navigable
in fact are navigable; and (3) Section 85-1-111, providing that navigable
waters and all streams of sufficient capacity to transport the products of the
country are public ways for the purposes of navigation and such transportation. In its summary judgment, the court found that the Dearborn was
navigable for recreational purposes and stated that the practical rule
should be:
A Montana stream is navigable and accessible for recreational
purposes over so much of its entire course as is navigable by
recreation craft at any given time. Over the length of such course,
the stream may be utilized between ordinary high water levels by
aquatic recreationists without interference from riparian proprietors. Once recreational navigability is established, access is not
limited to water craft. The angler may wade between the high
water lines, and if there7 is adequate dry footage below such lines
4
the hiker may walk.'
The Dearborn River was also found to be navigable for title purposes
according to the federal commercial use test 48 because at the time of
statehood, the river had been used for moving logs and railroad ties
downstream. Consequently, under well-established doctrine, the bed of the
river had belonged to the State of Montana since 1889.1"9 In a subsequent

144. Minutes, Joint Interim Subcommittee No. 2 (July 30, 1984).
145. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3(3).
146. No. 45148 (Ist Dist. Ct. Mont., Dec. 7, 1982).
147. Id. at 4.
148. Id. at 16.
149. Under federal law, each state acquired title to the bed and banks of navigable streams up to
the high water mark upon admission to the Union. See discussion at text notes 64 to 72. While under
MONT. CODE ANN., § 70-1-202 (1983), state ownership is asserted to all land below the water of a
navigable stream, under § 70-16-201, Montana (as a matter of state law) only owns the bed between the
low water marks; and the adjacent landowner owns the strip of land between the high and low water
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section of the opinion, the district court reemphasized reliance on statutes
and declined to find constitutional grounds for recreational access to the
Dearborn or other waters of the state. 150 The district court approvingly
cited the Montana Supreme Court's 1925 decision in Herrin v. Sutherland5 1 that "the public have no right to fish in a non-navigable body of
water, the bed of which is owned privately,"1 52 but having determined
navigability on'the basis of recreational use, the reach of Herrin was
sharply limited.
The Fifth Judicial District Court addressed similar issues in Montana
Coalitionfor Stream Access v. Hildreth.'53 This case arose from the
conflicting views of Hildreth and recreationists as to floating rights on a
stretch of the Beaverhead River running through Hildreth's property.
After hearing evidence of the extensive use of the Beaverhead for
recreational purposes (fishing, floating, hunting) and for contemporary
commercial uses (outfitters and trappers), the court found the Beaverhead
to be navigable under both a pleasure boat test and a commercial activity
test. 154 The court concluded that members of the public have the right to
use the waters and banks of the Beaverhead up to the ordinary high water
mark, free from interference, and also the right to portage around obstacles
in the least intrusive manner.1 5
2.

Legislative Responses: 1983-84

These two decisions, each handed down on December 7, 1982, focused
the attention of the 1983 legislature on the recreational use of the state's
waters. One reaction to the district court decisions was the introduction of
seven bills on the subject.1 56 The bills represented a variety of interests and

marks. See also Gibson v. Kelly, 15 Mont. 417, 39 P. 517 (1895).

150.

No. 45148 at 16-18 (1st Dist. Ct. Mont.).

151.
152.

74 Mont. 587, 241 P. 328 (1925).
Id. at 596, 241 P. at 331.

153.

No. 9604 (5th Dist. Ct. Mont., Dec. 7, 1982).

154.
155.

Id. at 14-15.
Id. at 15, 17.

156.

(1) H.B. 799, A Bill for an Act Entitled: "AN ACT TRANSFERRING

TITLE TO THE BED OF

NAVIGABLE STREAMS, BETWEEN LOW-WATER MARKS, TO THE ADJOINING LANDOWNERS; AMEND-

ING SECTIONS 70-1-202 AND 70-16-201, MCA" (Introduced by Neuman).
(2) H.B. 801, A Bill for an Act Entitled: "AN ACT ALLOWING AN OWNER OR LESSEE OF LAND
ADJOINING

A

NAVIGABLE STREAM TO FENCE OR BRIDGE ACROSS THE STREAM; REQUIRING THE

OWNER OR LESSEE TO POST AND MAINTAIN ONE OR MORE WARNING SIGNS OR DEVICES"

(Introduced

by Neuman).

(3) H.B. 877, A Bill for an Act Entitled: "AN ACT TO REQUIRE THAT DECALS

BE DISPLAYED ON

CRAFT FLOATING ON STREAMS AND TO PROVIDE FOR USE OF DECAL FEES COLLECTED FOR STREAM

MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES; AND PROVIDING A DELAYED EFFECTIVE DATE" (Introduced

by Ream and

others).

(4)

H.B. 888, A Bill for an Act Entitled: "AN ACT

TRANSFERRING TO THE ADJOINING
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covered a wide range of issues related to stream access. For example,
House Bill (HB) 799 would have conveyed title to the beds of navigable
streams to the adjacent landowners. HB 877 would have required acquisition of decals by recreational boat owners with the revenues from decal
sales earmarked to enhance recreational activities and to alleviate their
impact on waterways.
One of these seven bills, HB 888, introduced well after the opening of
the session, was characterized as a compromise and was one of only two
stream access' 1" bills to pass one of the houses. HB 888 would have
permitted recreational use of streams floatable by small craft, limited the
liability of adjacent landowners for injuries to floaters, permitted limited
portaging around obstructions on floatable streams; and established that a
prescriptive easement for use of waters may not be acquired by recreational
use. But HB 888 was not successful. It died in the Senate Agriculture
Committee. The minutes of the meetings at which HB 888 was considered
and then tabled' 58 do not indicate precisely why the bill failed. It may have
failed because some of those opposed to an expansion of public recreational
use rights were able to persuade committee members that the district court
decisions would be overturned or restricted by the Montana Supreme
Court.159

In the aftermath of the defeat of the compromise bill, the 1983
legislature passed House Joint Resolution (HJR) No. 36,160 authorizing an
interim study of recreational stream access and related issues. In June

LANDOWNERS TITLE TO THE BED OF A NAVIGABLE STREAM BETWEEN THE Low WATERMARKS;
ALLOWING PUBLIC USE OF NAVIGABLE STREAMS BY CERTAIN CRAFT; LIMITING THE LIABILITY OF
CERTAIN LANDOWNERS; MAKING USERS OF CERTAIN LAND LIABLE FOR DAMAGES; PROVIDING THAT
A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT CANNOT BE ACQUIRED BY RECREATIONAL USE WHEN PERMISSION HAS
SECTIONS 70-1-202, 70-16-201, 70-19-405, AND 85-1-112, MCA"
(Introduced by Marks and others).
(5) S.B. 347, A Bill for an Act Entitled: "AN ACT PROVIDING THAT A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT
CANNOT BE ACQUIRED BY RECREATIONAL USE; AMENDING SECTION 70-19-405, MCA." (Introduced
by Gait and others).
(6) S.B. 358, A Bill for an Act Entitled: "AN ACT TO AMEND THE DEFINITION OF "NAVIGABLE
STREAM"; AMENDING SECTION 85-1-112, MCA." (Introduced by Gait and others).
(7) S.B. 357, A Bill for an Act Entitled : "AN ACT ESTABLISHING A RIVER LITTER CLEAN-UP
BEEN GRANTED; AMENDING

PROGRAM IN THE DEPARTMENT OF FISH, WILDLIFE, AND PARKS; REQUIRING RIVER USERS TO BE

(Introduced by J. Jacobson and others).
The other was S.B. 347.
Minutes of the Senate Agriculture Comm., Mar. 11, 1983; Mar. 14, 1983.
Conversation with Representative Robert L. Marks, sponsor of H.B. 888, Feb. 26, 1985.
H.J. Res. 36, "A JOINT RESOLUTION OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF

LICENSED; SETTING FEES; AND PROVIDING PENALTIES."

157.
158.
159.
160.

THE STATE OF MONTANA

REQUESTING

AN INTERIM

STUDY TO IDENTIFY

AND PROVIDE FOR

PRESERVATION OF THE RIGHTS OF LANDOWNERS ADJACENT TO PUBLIC LAND AND WATERWAYS AND
TO IDENTIFY AND PROVIDE FOR RIGHTS OF THE PUBLIC TO ACCESS AND USE PUBLIC LAND AND
WATERWAYS; REQUIRING

A REPORT OF THE FINDINGS OF THE STUDY TO THE LEGISLATURE"

(Introduced by Keyser and others).

19851

MONTANA'S WATERS

1983, the Montana Legislative Council assigned the study to Joint Interim
Subcommittee No. 2.16'
The subcommittee met five times during the interim.1 62 At its first
meeting in August 1983, the subcommittee adopted a study plan to
organize its work. 6 3 In the next two meetings, the subcommittee devoted a
great deal of time to exploring the concept of "navigability" and its
implications for the public use of waterways. In January 1984, the
subcommittee attended oral arguments before the Montana Supreme
Court in the Curran case. A public hearing took up most of the
subcommittee's third meeting in March 1984, during which the subcommittee received testimony from interested persons for nearly eight hours.
Much of the testimony indicated a willingness on the part of representa64
tives of many different interests to work toward a common solution.1
After public testimony, the subcommittee, with encouragement from the
audience, recommended that interested groups and individuals organize on
the local level to attempt to identify the floatable and nonfloatable
waterways in their area. The soil conservation districts agreed to help
organize and facilitate these meetings. 6 5 Before any of these meetings
were held, however, the supreme court issued its Curran and Hildreth
decisions.' The decisions burst the bubble of hope for cooperation and
compromise that was carrying forward the idea for local public meetings,
and they were never held.
3.

Montana Supreme Court Decisions

On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the results of the
lower court decisions in Curranand Hildreth but departed significantly

161. A report of the findings of Joint Interim Subcomm. No. 2, entitled "Recreational Use of
Montana's Waterways," is available from the Montana Legislative Council.
162. Meetings were held: Aug. 30-31, 1983, Jan. 13-14, 1984, Mar.31, 1984, July 30, 1984 and
Sept. 28, 1984. Minutes of the meetings of Joint Interim Subcomm. No. 2 as well as testimony and
materials presented to the committee during the course of the interim are available from the Montana
Legislative Council.
163. The main thrust of the study plan can be summarized as follows: (1) What are the rights
and responsibilities of the public related to recreational use of Montana waterways, including rights
and responsibilities peripheral to the use of the waterways? (2) What are the rights (including title
interests) and responsibilities of landowners of land under and adjacent to Montana waterways, related
to recreational use of the waterways? (3) What is the nature of the conflict: who are the parties, what
are the issues, and what is its extent? (4) What can be done to resolve the conflict, what is the best
forum or method for its resolution (i.e. judicial, legislative, executive, voluntary cooperation,
education)?
164. See minutes of Joint Subcommittee No. 2, Mar. 31, 1984, 22-23, 26-31.

165. A soil conservation district is a governmental subdivision of the state created by petition of
electors whose purpose is to enhance the conservation of soil and water resource. See MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 76-15-101 to -701 (1983).
166. See supra notes 169-91 and accompanying text.
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from the reasoning in those earlier decisions. In Curran,the supreme court
affirmed the district court's application of the federal test of navigability
for title and, consistently with the district court, drew a sharp line between
the federal law tests of navigability for title and the state law tests of
8 7
navigability based on public recreational use.
Unlike the district court, the supreme court found the bases for its
decision in the public trust doctrine and in the 1972 Montana Constitution.
The court drew its explanation of the public trust doctrine from U.S.
Supreme Court decisions relating to the transfer of navigable waters and
the soils under them from the federal government to the states at the time of
statehood. 6 8 Central to those cases was the proposition (the "equal footing
doctrine") that during the territorial period, the waters and streambeds of
navigable waterways were held in trust for the future states to be "dealt
with for the public benefit"' 69 by the states after their admission to the
Union.
Although the Montana Supreme Court paired the public trust
doctrine with the equal footing doctrine as considerations in determining
navigability-for-title questions, the court did not confine its treatment of
the public trust doctrine to waters found navigable under the federal test.
The development of the court's broader application of the public trust
doctrine encompassed (1) recognition of the increased tendency for state
courts to find navigability for recreational use as well as for commercial
purposes, and (2) the substitution of an inquiry as to whether water was
susceptible to public use for earlier inquiries into navigability and title to
streambeds.' 70
After discussing these national developments, the Montana Supreme
Court set forth the language of the 1972 Montana Constitution:
All surface, underground, flood, and atmospheric waters within
the boundaries of the state are the property of the state for the use
of its people and are subject to appropriation for beneficial uses as
7
provided by law.' '
As for rights on the Dearborn, the supreme court found that Curran
had no right of ownership to the riverbed or surface waters because
ownership was held by the federal government prior to statehood in trust

167. __
Mont. at -,
682 P.2d at 168.
168. Id. at -,
682 P.2d at 167-68.
169. Id. at -,
682 P.2d at 167.
170. Id. at -,
682 P.2d at 169-170. In addition to citing cases from other state supreme
courts, the Montana Supreme Court noted the commentary, as had the First Judicial District Court, of
Prof. Albert W. Stone. The district court cited Stone, Legal Background on Recreational Use of
Montana Waters,32 MONT.L.REV. 1 (1971); the supreme court cited Stone, MONTANA WATER LAW
FOR THE 1980s (1981).
171. Mont. at -,
682 P.2d at 170, citing MONT.CONST. art. IX, § 3(3).
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for the people, and title was transferred to the state upon statehood
"burdened by this public trust. 1 72
.
Under the Montana Constitution,
Curran had no right to control the use of the surface waters of the Dearborn
to the exclusion of the public "except to the extent of his prior appropriation of part of the water for irrigation purposes. 1 73 Looking beyond the
Dearborn situation, the court stated:
In essence, the question is whether the waters owned by the State
under the Constitution are susceptible to recreational use by the
public. The capability of use of the waters for recreational
purposes determines their availabilityfor recreationaluse by
the public. Streambedownershipby a privateparty is irrelevant.
If the waters are owned by the State and held in trustfor the
people by the State, no privateparty may bar the use of those
waters by the people. The Constitution and the public trust
doctrine do not permit a private party to interfere with the
public's right to recreational use of the surface of the State's
waters.17 "
To the Montana Supreme Court in the spring of 1984, the portion of
the 1925 Herrin v. Sutherland-7 decision prohibiting fishing in waters
over a streambed in private ownership appeared to be irrelevant. The
earlier case concerned a stream regarded as non-navigable, and the court
stated that the "holding is purely dicta" 1 7 6 and contrary to the public trust
1 77
doctrine and the 1972 Constitution.
Drawing on both statutes and caselaw,"1 the court held that the
public has a right to use state-owned waters to the point of the high water
mark.17 In case of obstructions in the water, the public is allowed to
portage around the barriers in the least intrusive way possible. Despite the
breadth of the declaration of public rights in the state's waters, the court's
order states unequivocally that the public does not have the right to enter
into or trespass across private property in order to enjoy the recreational
use of state-owned waters. 18 0
Although the question of the navigability of the Dearborn River under
the federal test was analyzed and determined in Curran, the supreme
court's opinion ultimately subordinated the issue. The court might have

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
Gibson v.
179.
180.

Id. at _
682 P.2d at 170.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
74 Mont. at 596, 241 P. at 328.
Mont. at _
682 P.2d at 171.
Id.
Id.at_,682P.2dat 172, citing MONT.
Kelly, 15 Mont. 417, 39 P. 517 (1895).
Mont. at _
682 P.2d at 172.
Id.

CODE ANN.

§§70-16-201,87-2-305(1983),and
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based its holding on the conclusion that the Dearborn was navigable under
the federal test. If it had done so, it could have held that under the public
trust doctrine as traditionally applied, the state was obligated to manage
the riverbed and overlying water so that they would not pass into private
ownership or control, but remain open to public use.
The Montana Supreme Court instead detached its treatment of
streambed title on the Dearborn from the issue of the public's right to use
the river under the Montana Constitution and the public trust doctrine.
The court thus articulated a test for determining the availability of
waterways for public recreational use that is not linked to streambed
ownership.
Within little more than a month, the breadth of the Curran holding
was underscored by the court's decision in Hildreth. Drawing from the
Curran decision, the court emphasized that "the capability of use of the
waters for recreational purposes determines whether the water can be so
used."'' There are no limitations in the Montana constitutional provision
that the state owns the water for the benefit of its people.' 82 The only
possible limitation of use must arise from the characteristics of the waters
themselves. No owner of property adjacent to state-owned water has the
right to control the use of those waters as they flow through his property.
The pleasure boat test is not adopted in Montana as it is "unnecessary and
improper to determine a specific test under which to find navigability for
recreational use."' 8 3 Neither was there a need for the district court to
employ a commercial use test, as that federal test is used to determine
navigability for title purposes and not navigability for use.
Also carried forward from Curranwas an enunciation of the public's
right to portage around barriers8 4 (although not specifying artificial or
natural) in a manner that will avoid damage to the adjacent landowner's
property. 185 Again, too, the supreme court declared that the public had no
right to enter upon or cross over private property to reach state-owned
water held available for recreational purposes.' 8 6
As part of his appeal, Hildreth contended that the district court should
have determined title to the streambed of the Beaverhead which he

181. Mont. at -,
684 P.2d at 1091.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. One of the issues in initial proceedings before the Fifth Judicial District Court concerned a
fence that Hildreth had placed on the downstream side of a bridge crossing the Beaverhead River on his
property. The fence was removed as a result of a preliminary injunction and the court's final order
specifically referred to the right to portage around an artificial obstacle in a manner least intrusive to
the landowner. No. 9604 at 16.
186. Mont. at _,
684 P.2d at 1091.
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asserted belonged to him because it ran through its property. The supreme
court dismissed this contention, again drawing from Curranto reemphasize that the question of title to the underlying streambed is immaterial in
determining navigability for recreational use of state-owned waters. 187
There is also consistency with Curran in the court's restatement of the
holding that "under the Public Trust Doctrine and the 1972 Montana
Constitution, any surface waters that are capable of recreational use may
be so used by the public without regard to streambed ownership or
navigability for nonrecreational purposes." 188
In Curran,the Montana Supreme Court dismissed a contention that
property was being taken without compensation because the court found
that Curran had no claims to the waters of the Dearborn, and hence there
could be no taking. 189 In Hildreth,a similar claim was dismissed because
rights of public use of the waters of the Beaverhead had been determined,
not title.190
While affirming a district court opinion in Curranthat referred to an
angler's right to wade and a hiker's right to walk between high water marks
on a stream available for public use, the Montana Supreme Court had
emphasized a recreationist's use of surface waters, more than the bed and
banks of a stream. In Hildreth,the court expressly addressed both issues in
its declaration that "the public has the right to use the waters and the bed
and banks up to the ordinary high water mark." 191
4. Legislative Responses: 1984-85
The initial reaction of the interim legislative subcommittee to first the
Currandecision, and then the sweeping Hildrethdecision, was uncertainty
as to what, of the subcommittee's original charge, was left for it to perform.
Further, of special import to the subcommittee was the supreme court's use
of the Montana Constitution and the public trust doctrine as bases for its
decisions and the effect that this might have on legislative authority.
At the first meeting following the decisions, the subcommittee turned
its attention to the public trust doctrine by reviewing two presentations on
its meaning.1 92 The presentations indicated to the subcommittee that the
legislature's authority in the area was limited but not eliminated by
application of the public trust doctrine. The subcommittee also heard
187. Id. at -,
684 P.2d at 1092.
188. Id. at _
684 P.2d at 1093.
189. Mont. at _
682 P.2d at 171.
684 P.2d at 1093 (emphasis in original).
190. Mont. at 191. Id. at _
684 P.2d at 1091.
192. The papers presented: "The Public Trust Chautauqua Comes to Town: Implications for
Montana's Water Future," by John E. Thorson and ". . .The Doctrine is Out There Awaiting
Recognition." by Margery H. Brown are available from the Montana Legislative Council.
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presentations on and discussed the following issues that had been raised
repeatedly during the interim: trespass and damage caused by recreationists; the possibility of acquisition of prescriptive easements through
recreational use; and the extent, if any, of landowners' liability for injuries
incurred by recreationists on waterways or on adjacent private land.
Ultimately, the subcommittee recommended two bills to the 1985
legislature. HB 16193 was relatively restrictive of recreational use in that,
on waterways deemed non-navigable under the federal title test, the bill
allowed use of the bed of the waterway only when unavoidable and
incidental to use of the waters. 194 The remainder of the bill restated several
elements of the stream access decisions and addressed a variety of
problems associated with recreational activities. The bill defined "ordinary
high-water mark," defined "barrier" for the purpose of clarifying the scope
of the public's portage rights, eliminated recreational use of land or water
as a basis for acquisition of a prescriptive easement, and restricted
landowner liability to recreational users of adjacent waterways. HB 17195
created a new strict liability crime of trespass to land. The bill would have
also eliminated the "posting requirement," i.e., the precondition for
criminal trespass of communication by the property owner that entry is not
permitted.
In addition to the interim subcommittee's two bills, nine bills
concerning stream access were introduced into the 1985 legislature. 196

193.

A Bill for an Act Entitled: "AN ACT TO GENERALLY DEFINE LAWS GOVERNING

RECREATIONAL USE OF STATE WATERS; PROHIBITING RECREATIONAL USE OF DIVERTED WATERS;
PROHIBITING, WITH CERTAIN EXCEPTIONS, USE OF PRIVATE LAND BENETH WATERS; RESTRICTING
THE LIABILITY OF LANDOWNERS WHEN WATER IS BEING USED FOR RECREATION OR LAND IS BEING
USED AS AN INCIDENT OF WATER RECREATION; PROVIDING THAT A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT CANNOT

MCA; REPEALING SECTION
87-2-305, MCA; AND PROVIDING AN IMMEDIATE EFFECTIVE DATE." The bill draft was approved by a
vote of 6-2.
194. The committee intended this aspect of the bill to be patterned after the Supreme Court of
Wyoming's decision in Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961).
195. A Bill for an Act Entitled: "AN ACT ELIMINATING THE REQUIREMENT THAT NOTICE BE
BE ACQUIRED BY RECREATIONAL USE; AMENDING SECTION 70-19-405,

POSTED OR OTHERWISE COMMUNICATED

FOR THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE OF CRIMINAL

TRESPASS TO LAND; IMPOSING ABSOLUTE LIABILITY FOR CERTAIN CRIMINAL TRESPASSES TO LAND;
EXPANDING THE AUTHORITY OF WARDENS TO ENFORCE

THE CRIMINAL

MISCHIEF, CRIMINAL

TRESPASS, AND LITTER LAWS ON PRIVATE LANDS BEING USED FOR RECREATIONAL PURPOSES;
AMENDING SECTIONS 10-1-612, 45-6-201, 45-6-203, AND 87-1-504; AND PROVIDING AN IMMEDIATE
EFFECTIVE DATE." The bill draft was approved by a vote of 6-2.
196. (I) H.B. 265, A Bill for an Act Entitled: "AN ACT GENERALLY DEFINING LAWS
RELATING TO

RECREATIONAL

USE OF STATE WATERS;

PROHIBITING

RECREATIONAL

USE OF

DIVERTED WATERS; RESTRICTING THE LIABILITY OF LANDOWNERS WHEN WATER IS BEING USED FOR
RECREATION; ESTABLISHING THE RIGHT TO PORTAGE; PROVIDING THAT A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT
CANNOT BE ACQUIRED BY RECREATIONAL USE OFSURFACE WATERS; AMENDING SECTION 70-19-405,

MCA; AND PROVIDING AN IMMEDIATE EFFECTIVE DATE AND AN APPLICABILITY DATE" (Introduced
by Ream and Marks).
(2) H.B. 275, A Bill for an Act Entitled: "AN ACT GENERALLY DEFINING LAWS RELATING TO

1985]

MONTANA'S WATERS

35

Three of the bills, HB 265, HB 275 and HB 498, were attempts to address
the issues in a comprehensive manner. The three bills were modeled in part
on HB 16; and each bill contained some elements of HB 16. House Bill 265,
which ultimately was successful, was regarded as the "compromise bill;" it
was the work product of a coalition of recreational and agricultural groups.
The bill as introduced provided for the division of the state's waterways into
two classes, largely based on size; the extent and type of public use
permitted on a particular waterway would be determined by the class into
which it falls. HB 265 also provided for increased regulation of recreational
uses of waterways by the Montana Fish and Game Commission which
would be required to establish a procedure for receiving and determining
requests that recreational use of a particular waterway be limited for the
1 97
protection of the waterway.

RECREATIONAL USE OF STATE WATERS; PROHIBITING RECREATIONAL USE OF DIVERTED WATERS;
RESTRICTING THE LIABILITY OF LANDOWNERS WHEN WATER IS BEING USED FOR RECREATION;

ESTABLISHING THE RIGHT TO PORTAGE; PROVIDING THAT A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT CANNOT BE
ACQUIRED BY RECREATIONAL USE OFSURFACE WATERS; AMENDING SECTION

70-19-405, MCA; AND

PROVIDING AN IMMEDIATE EFFECTIVE DATE AND AN APPLICABILITY DATE." (Introduced by Cobb).
(3) H.B. 498, A Bill for an Act Entitled: "AN ACT TO GENERALLY DEFINE LAWS GOVERNING
THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF PROPERTY OWNERS AND THE PUBLIC RELATED TO RECREATIONAL USE OF STATE WATERS; PROVIDING DEFINITIONAL TERMS; PROHIBITING RECREATIONAL USE
OF DIVERTED WATERS; RESTRICTING THE LIABILITY OF LANDOWNERS WHEN WATER IS BEING USED
FOR RECREATION OR LAND IS BEING USED AS AN INCIDENT OF WATER RECREATION; PROVIDING THAT
A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT CANNOT BE ACQUIRED BY RECREATIONAL USE; GRANTING POWERS TO
PROTECT AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS THROUGH LIMITATIONS OF PUBLIC USE UPON SURFACE WATERS;

AMENDING SECTION

70-19-405, MCA;

AND PROVIDING AN IMMEDIATE EFFECTIVE DATE" (Intro-

duced by Ellison).

(4)

H.B. 520, A Bill for an Act Entitled: "AN ACT CLARIFYING THAT THE PUBLIC DOES NOT

HAVE THE RIGHT TO MAKE RECREATIONAL USE OF WATERS THAT HAVE BEEN DIVERTED FOR

PURPOSES OF APPROPRIATION" (Introduced by Grady and others).
(5) H.B. 911, A Bill for an Act Entitled: "AN ACT PROVIDING SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR
POSTING OF LAND FOR THE PURPOSES OFTHE CRIMINALTRESPASS LAW; EXPANDING THE AUTHORITY
OF WARDENS TO ENFORCE THE CRIMINAL MISCHIEF, CRIMINAL TRESPASS, AND LITTER LAWS ON

PRIVATE LANDS BEING USED FOR RECREATIONAL PURPOSES; AMENDING SECTIONS 45-6-201 AND 871-504, MCA; AND PROVIDING AN IMMEDIATE EFFECTIVE DATE" (Introduced by Hannah and Brown).
(6) S.B. 418, A Bill for an Act Entitled: "AN ACT DEFINING 'ORDINARY HIGH-WATER
MARK'" (Introduced by Boylan and others).
(7) S.B. 421, A Bill for an Act Entitled: "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR LIMITATION OF LIABILITY OF
A LANDOWNER OR TENANT TOWARD PERSONS MAKING RECREATIONAL USE OF SURFACE WATERS

ADJACENT TO THE LANDOWNER'S OR TENANT'S LAND" (Introduced by Story).
(8) S.B. 424, A Bill for an Act Entitled: "AN ACT DEFINING 'PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT';
PROVIDING THAT A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT MAY NOT BE ACQUIRED THROUGH RECREATIONAL USE
OF LAND OR WATER; AMENDING SECTION 70-19-405, MCA" (Introduced by B. Williams and others).
(9) S.B. 435, A Bill for an Act Entitled: "AN ACT PROVIDING THAT PERMISSION OF THE
LANDOWNER MuST BE OBTAINED PRIOR TO USING PRIVATE LAND FOR RECREATIONAL PURPOSES;
AMENDING SECTIONS 87-1-504 AND 87-1-505, MCA" (Introduced by Galt).

Ultimately, three of the bills were passed and approved: H.B. 265,1985 Mont. Laws ch. 556; H.B.
520, 1985 Mont. Laws ch. 429; and H.B. 911, 1985 Mont. Laws ch. 599.
197. The Statement of Intent attached to H.B. 265 which is required under MONT. CODE ANN. §
5-4-404 (1983), because the bill delegates authority to an administrative agency, states in part: "In its
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House Bills 16, 265 and 275 were heard by the House Agriculture,
Fish and Game, and Judiciary Committees' 9 8 at a well-attended joint
hearing on January 22, 1985.111 The House Judiciary Committee heard
HB 498 ten days later. 20 0 The chair of the House Judiciary Committee
assigned the four bills to a subcommittee; and, after several meetings, the
subcommittee recommended to the full Judiciary Committee that HB 265
be approved with amendments proposed by the subcommittee. The full
committee approved the bill with the subcommittee's amendments incorporated into it. The bill was approved unchanged by the House of
Representatives on February 16.201 House Bill 265 was heard by the
Senate Judiciary Committee on March 8, 1985. It again was assigned to a
subcommittee which met four times but was unable to reach agreement on
a bill.20 2 On March 27, the full Senate Judiciary Committee considered the
bill and attached to it substantial amendments that were very restrictive of
recreational use. The full Senate removed some of the most restrictive
amendments, but then amended the bill further to prohibit the use of beds
and banks of streams. A conference committee removed this prohibition
and agreed on a bill that was signed by the Governor on April 19, 1985.20
House Bill 17, the interim committee's criminal trespass bill, was
heard by the House Judiciary Committee on February 14, 1985. Opponents of the bill were very critical of its elimination of notice requirements
and of its provisions creating a strict liability trespass crime. 20 4 The House
Judiciary Committee, dissatisfied with HB 17 but desiring to address the
trespass issue, requested a committee bill, HB 911.205 This bill provided for
posting of land either by written notice or by marking an object, such as a
tree, with fluorescent orange paint at entries to property. 20 6 House Bill 911

implementation of this bill, the long-range goal of the commission must be to preserve, protect, and
enhance the surface waters of this state while facilitating the public's exercise of its recreational use
rights on surface waters. The commission shall strive to permit broad exercise of public rights, while
protecting the water resource and its ecosystem."
198. The bill had been referred to the House Judiciary Committee which was the only one of the
three committees that would vote on the bills.
199. Minutes of the House Judiciary Comm. (Jan. 22, 1985). The other three bills considered by
the subcommittee were eventually tabled by the House Judiciary Committee.
200. Minutes of the House Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 14, 1985).
201. An unsuccessful attempt was made by Representative Dave Brown to amend the bill to
permit big game hunting on large (Class I) waterways. House Journal, Feb. 16, 1985, pages 14-15.
202. Minutes of the Senate Judiciary Comm. (Mar. 27, 1985).
203. H.B. 265 was altered significantly during its passage through the legislature. The final
version retained the classification system, but specifically excepted lakes from the bill's coverage. The
bill set up a somewhat complicated procedure for the establishment of public portage routes around
barriers in waterways and limited the application of the portage provision to artificial barriers.
204. Minutes of the House Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 14, 1985).
205. Minutes of the House Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 14, Feb. 22, 1985).
206. Utah has a similar posting law, UTAH CODE ANN. 23-20-14 (1981).
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was signed by the Governor on April 22, 1985.
In enacting HB 265 and HB 911, the Forty-Ninth Legislature made a
serious effort to come to terms with the stream access controversy. The
Fiftieth Legislature, and those that follow, will continue to work toward
achieving and maintaining a just resolution of the interests of all affected
parties. Public trust principles are certain to play a significant role in that
work.
B. State Water Policy
While the stream access controversy occupied Montana's courts and
legislature between 1982 and 1985, public trust considerations (though not
denominated as such) were being played out in a different setting. The
Montana legislature reacted in late 1982 to three events: the U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Sporhase v. Nebraska'07 (which held that states cannot
impose an absolute ban on the exportation of water and cast doubt on the
legality of Montana's coal slurry ban2 08 ); the resulting possibility of
interstate coal slurry pipelines originating in the state (such as the Energy
Transportation Systems, Inc. (ETSI) coal slurry pipeline project in South
Dakota that promised lucrative financial rewards from the purchase of the
state's water 209); and the release by the Montana Department of Natural
Resources and Conservation (DNRC) of an important report 210 (the
"Trelease Report") setting forth a strategy to protect Montana's options
for future instate use of the waters of the Missouri River in the face of
expanding use by downstream states.
By the commencement of the 1983 legislature, these three events
converged. Montana needed to protect its waters, principally on the
Missouri, from potentially harmful appropriations in downstream states.
State control over its waters had been significantly weakened by the
holding in Sporhase, and its long-term effects were uncertain. South
Dakota had turned the damage done by Sporhase to state water jurisdiction into a huge, potential $1.4 billion bonanza.2"1 Other states were likely
to follow, with uncertain effects on the allocation of Missouri River water.
Montana needed to develop its water through projects such as the
improvement of the Tongue River Dam in the southeastern part of the
state, but substantial funds were needed. Therefore, the conclusion seemed
207.
208.

458 U.S. 941 (1982).
Until H.B. 680 was passed in the 1985 legislative session, the use of water for coal slurry

purposes was not a beneficial use of the water.
209.

U.S.

MONT. CODE ANN.

§ 85-2-104 (1983).

DEP'T INTERIOR, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON ENERGY TRANS-

PORTATION SYSTEM, INC. COAL SLURRY PIPELINE TRANSPORTATION PROJECT

210.
MONTANA

211.

(2 vol. July 1981).

MONT. DEP'T NATURAL RESOURCES & CONSERV., WATER PROTECTION STRATEGY FOR

(Sept. 1982).
Great Falls Tribune, Nov. 25, 1982, at 4-D, cols. 1-3.
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logical at the time: sell water to produce revenues to fund the water
development projects necessary to save Montana's water. Increasingly, the
refrain became "use it or lose it!"
In the weeks before the convening of the 1983 legislature, water
marketing was much discussed. The Powder River Pipeline Company
expressed interest in the purchase of water for a coal slurry pipeline from
eastern Montana to the Midwest.2 12 Governor Ted Schwinden announced
his own interest in investigating the possible sale of Montana's surplus
waters. He indicated that he would prefer a thorough study of the issue, but
that the state might not be able to wait that long because "[n] one of the old
rules apply anymore." 13 The director of the DNRC drew a relationship
between water marketing and the implementation of the Trelease strategy
on the Missouri. He described the option of selling 200,000 acre-feet per
year (ac-ft/yr) of stored and surplus water as a means of funding water
development projects which had been identified by the Trelease study as
the most certain means to secure water from downstream claims.214
During the 1983 legislative session, three bills were introduced
concerning water marketing.2 15 Only one, HB 908, was eventually passed,
with substantial amendments. The bill was originally intended to
strengthen water permit criteria, repeal the anti-export ban, and place
large pipelines under the Major Facility Siting Act.216 The bill as passed
accomplished two very different things. First, the measure authorized a
temporary water marketing program which broadened the authority of
DNRC to purchase or acquire water from any federal reservoir (not just
Fort Peck, as under the then-existing law2 17) for the purposes of "sale, rent,
or distribution for industrial or other purposes."2 18 The anti-export ban
was repealed, and detailed public interest criteria for the issuance of
permits (retaining ultimate legislative approval of certain large diversions)
were placed into law. These provisions were to expire on June 30, 198 5, and
the pre-existing law would be revived 219 unless the Forty-Ninth Legislature acted.
The second accomplishment of HB 908 was the creation of a Select
Committee on Water Marketing to "undertake a study of economic, tax,
212. Id., Jan. 12, 1983, at 8-A, cols. 1-6.
213. Id., Jan. 9, 1983, at 7-A, cols. 3-6.
214. Id., Jan. 12, 1983, at 8-A, cols. 1-6.
215. H.B. 893, 894 & 908, 48th Leg. (1983).
216. MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-20-101 to 75-20-1205 (1983).
217. Id. § 85-1-205 (1981).
218. Id. § 85-1-205 (1983).
219. The constitutionality of such automatic revision has been put in question by Immigration &
Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983), concerning the legislative veto. See Sullivan,
The Power of Congress Under the Property Clause: A Potential Check on the Effects of the Chadha
Decision on Public Land Legislation, 6 Pub. Land L. Rev. (1985).
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administrative, legal, social, and environmental advantages and disadvantages of water marketing."22 Over the course of the two-year study, the
Select Committee met for nine official meetings, two seminars, and three
public hearings. In the course of its work, the committee received extensive
testimony, both written and oral, from numerous individuals and
organizations.
In its final report, 221 the Select Committee emphasized the importance of a comprehensive state water policy to maximize and reserve for the
present and future use of its citizens Montana's fair share of the water in
interstate rivers and streams-particularly those of the Missouri. To
articulate this policy, the committee authored a bill, HB 680.222 The bill
passed both the House and Senate with relatively minor amendments and
was signed into law by the Governor on April 19, 1985.23

In the development of this bill by the Select Committee, there was
infrequent mention of the public trust doctrine as a basis for legislative
action. But, in two major respects, Montana has now uniquely codified the
public interest considerations guaranteed in the state constitution and
recognized by the state supreme court in Curranand Hildreth.These two
major legislative public interest provisions require the analysis of public
interest criteria for future water use and the limitation on the volume of
water a private user can appropriate.
1. Public Interest Criteriafor Water Use
Since 1973, persons have had to apply for a permit from the DNRC to
appropriate surface water (except for certain stockwatering purposes).224
The DNRC has based its decision for the issuance of a permit on the
criteria contained in Section 85-2-311 of the Montana Code. The requirements include: the existence of unappropriated waters in the source of
supply; no adverse effect on the water rights of prior appropriators; and the
adequacy of the proposed means of diversion or construction. In addition,
the proposed use of water must be a beneficial use which will not interfere
unreasonably with other planned water uses or development for which a
permit has been issued or a reservation has been made.
In HB 908, the 1983 legislature modified Section 85-2-311 by
including two additional requirements: (1) for appropriations of 10,000 acft/yr or more, or 15 cubic feet per second (cfs) or more, the DNRC must
220.

1983 Mont. Laws ch. 706, § 4(2).

221. MONT. SELECT COMM. ON WATER MARKETING, REPORT TO THE 49TH MONTANA
LEGISLATURE (Dec. 1984).

222.
223.
224.

H.B. 680, 49th Leg. (1985).
1985 Mont. Laws ch. 573 [subsequent references are to H.B. 680].
MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-306 (1983).
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"affirmatively find" that the foregoing criteria are met and must consider
additional factors such as economic and environmental impacts and
benefits to the state; and (2) consumptive uses of 10,000 ac-ft/yr or more,
or 15 cfs or more, must be approved by the Legislature. As previously
noted, these last two requirements were enacted on a temporary two-year
basis.
The addition of economic and environmental criteria marked the first
successful incorporation of public trust considerations into Montana's
statutes.22 5 Specifically, the Legislature required consideration of the
following factors before a new water permit could be issued:
1. Other demands on the state water supply, including such
other needs as water reservations for future beneficial use,
municipal water needs, irrigation needs, and the need for
minimum streamflows to protect existing water rights and
aquatic life;
2. The benefits of the proposed water use to the applicant and
the state, including228a consideration of the economic feasibility of
the proposed use.
3. Water quality;
4. The possible creation of saline seep; and
5. Other probable significant environmental effects as identified through the environmental impact statement process.
With this set of criteria, the legislature tentatively accepted the
proposition that, at least as to future water appropriations, water permits
would be issued only after the systematic and serious consideration of
public interest concerns. It was left to the Select Committee on Water
Marketing to determine whether this integration of the appropriation and
public trust concerns would be made permanent.
The Select Committee recommended, and the 1985 Legislature
undertook, a substantial revision of the water permit requirements. This
revision requires the application of increasingly stringent public interest
criteria to applications for new water permits. But because the drafters of
the legislation feared that these permit criteria would encourage potential
appropriators to circumvent the criteria by purchasing existing water
rights (and subsequently changing the type or location of use) or by
securing water under the state's reservation system, 227 the public interest
criteria have also been written into the "change in appropriation right" and
reservation provisions of the law.
Essentially, HB 680, as passed by the Legislature, creates three levels

225. Id. § 85-2-311.
226. A consideration of economic feasibility was deleted by the 1985 Legislature. H.B. 680,49th
Leg. § 4.
227. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-316 (1983).
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of public interest criteria and a special set of "out-of-state" conservation
criteria for evaluating permit applications, change of appropriation
applications, and reservation of water applications.
When applying for new water permits, potential appropriators must
satisfy either "Level 1" or "Level 2" criteria, regardless of whether the
water will be used in or out-of-state and the special conservation criteria if
water is to be moved out-of-state. The most innovative feature of the
legislation, however, is the requirement that water be leased from the state
in the event that (1) water in excess of 4000 ac-ft/yr and 5.5 cfs will be
consumed; or (2) water in any amount will be moved outside six specified
2 28
basins.
"Level 1" public interest criteria roughly parallel pre-1983 criteria.
These criteria apply to appropriations less than 4000 ac-ft/yr and 5.5 cubic
feet per second (cfs) 22 9 and require only the traditional examination of the
potential effect of a new water use on other appropriators in a basin (e.g.,
whether there is sufficient unappropriated water, whether there will be
adverse effect on prior appropriators, whether the diversion will be
properly constructed, whether the proposed use is beneficial).
"Level 2" public interest criteria, applying to diversions in excess of
4000 ac-ft/yr and 5.5 cfs, are a restatement of the temporary criteria
added in 1983. By permanently adopting these criteria, the Legislature has
made clear that large diversions will be carefully evaluated on the basis of a
broader, statewide public interest. The legislature reduced the threshold
for the application of "Level 2" public interest criteria because the
statistical data generated by DNRC indicated that the temporary 10,000
ac-ft/yr, 15 cfs, threshold was too high. Additionally, DNRC again
recommended making the annual and per second volume a conjunctive
requirement (i.e., ac-ft/yr and cfs) because the "either-or" requirement
(i.e., ac-ft/yr or cfs) was picking up appropriators who had high seasonal
uses due to irrigated agriculture but relatively small annual uses.
The legislature added a unique set of public interest criteria to provide
an especially careful review of applications to move water out-of-state.
These special conservation criteria were designed to provide the state with
constitutionally permissible means to regulate and review out-of-state
movement of water. They stem from the opportunity left by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Sporhasefor states to prefer their own citizens for water
if necessary for "health and safety" purposes.2 30 The language of the
criteria is based on a New Mexico statute 23 1 that was passed in response to
228.
229.
230.
231.

H.B. 680, § 3.
Id. at § 4(1).
458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-3 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
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El Paso v. Reynolds,232 a federal district court decision that struck down
New Mexico's ban of the exportation of groundwater. The revised statute
was substantially approved by the same court.2"'
The new Montana conservation requirements include a general
statement of legislative intent that "under appropriate conditions, the outof-state transportation and use of [Montana's] waters are not in conflict
with the public welfare of its citizens or the conservation of its waters,
"24 The section thereafter requires the applicant to satisfy "by clear
and convincing evidence" specific criteria as to (1) whether the water
subject to the application could be used within Montana to alleviate water
shortages; and (2) whether the water is available to the applicant in the
23
state to which he seeks to export Montana water. 1
As indicated in the following sections, applicants must now lease
water from the state when they seek to consume water in excess of 4000 acft/yr and 5.5 cfs or to move water in any amount out of six specified water
basins located principally within the state. 23 6 The legislation also requires
applicants to satisfy the relevant public interest criteria and the requirements of the Montana Environmental Policy Act.
As explained above, drafters of the legislation were concerned that
potential appropriators would seek to avoid the public interest criteria and
the state leasing program by acquiring existing rights and securing a
change in type of use, place of use, or place of diversion from the
department. HB 680 prevents this by incorporating the "Level 1," "Level
2," and special conservation standards in a substantially revised Section
85-2-402, "Change in appropriation rights." The specialized requirement
("Level 3") is set forth for change applications that would result in
consumption of water in excess of 4000 ac-ft/yr and 5.5 cfs. These change
applications must be approved by the legislature.
Finally, and for similar reasons, the special conservation public
interest criteria have been added to the reservation of waters procedures set
forth in Section 85-2-316. While it has not been used for this purpose, the
reservation of water system does allow water to be reserved for existing, as
well as future beneficial uses. 23 7 The final language reflects the legislative
conclusion that the pre-1985 language allows the Board of Natural
Resources and Conservation to protect the public interest in the process.
Also, the Legislature concluded that requiring the leasing of water for

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. 379 (D.N.M. 1983).
El Paso v. Reynolds, 597 F. Supp. 694 (D.N.M. 1984).
H.B. 680 at § 4(3).
Id. at § 4(3)(b).
Id. at § 12.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-316(1) (1983).
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reservations in excess of 4000 ac-ft/yr and 5.5 cfs would be a disincentive to
establishing water reservations.
2. Water Leasingand Curtailmentof the PrivateAbility to Appropriate
Water
The second major feature of the 1985 water policy legislation is an
innovative limitation on the private ability to appropriate water. The
underlying rationale for this program is conservation and fair consideration for the use of the state's water resources-those water users who
consume large amounts of water must pay. The DNRC administers the
program. Fifty thousand acre-feet of water have been authorized for
leasing by the legislature. The department can differentiate in pricing, and
the legislature made clear its intent to prefer agricultural uses. In the
future, a person will be unable to appropriate water (and the state will be
unable to issue a permit) when either (1) water would be consumed in
excess of 4000 ac-ft/yr and 5.5 cfs, or (2) water would be moved in any
amount out of certain river basins. 238 The specified river basins (including
tributaries) are those of the Clark Fork, Kootenai, St. Mary, Little
Missouri, Yellowstone, and Missouri Rivers.239 Many of these basins
extend into adjoining states, and the St. Mary and Kootenai extend into
Canada. In these two instances, water must be leased from the state for
terms not to exceed 50 years (the terms can be renewed).240
The Select Committee promoted these significant changes for several
reasons. 2 14' First, the Committee was reluctant to continue the ability of
private parties to secure perpetual rights to large quantities of water.
Second, the Committee believed that users of large amounts of water
should pay fair consideration for the resource (with the additional result
that there would be an incentive for greater conservation of the resource).
And third, the Committee believed that the threat of environmental harm
is greatest when water is moved out of ecologically defined watersheds.
While not expressed as such, these justifications parallel closely the
concerns and legislative obligations that are at the foundation of the public
trust doctrine.
The leasing program that passed as a part of HB 680 offers the state
the opportunity to exercise diligent stewardship over the important waters
of the state. The state can require environmentally sound terms and
conditions in leases for water. Fair payment for the waters can be required,
238.

H.B. 680 § 3.

239. Id. at § 3(2).
240. Id. at § 12(4).
241. See generally MONT.

SELECT COMM. ON WATER MARKETING,

supra note 221.
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as
although DNRC is authorized to differentiate in pricing. 242 Also, because
243
the state will be a proprietor as to the leased water, the DNRC may be
able to regulate the interstate movement of water in a fashion that would be
otherwise impermissible under the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S.
2 44

Constitution.

V.

CONCLUSION

As has been reviewed in the preceding sections, Montana has recently

undertaken major efforts to recognize and enforce public rights in water.
The courts and legislature have recognized that, as the cultural use and
importance of water changes, so must water policies, laws, and institutions,
yet, judicial and legislative efforts have been controversial.
The legislative and judicial actions discussed previously are recent but
they are manifestations of an evolution in cultural attitude that has been
developing for many years. 245 As has been traced here, historically, the
nature of property rights in water has differed from that of property rights
in other kinds of property. Thus, traditionally it has been impermissible for

an adjacent landowner to impede the flow of commerce on certain publicly
important waterways or, in some instances to prevent the public from
fishing in those waters. Similarly, in the American West and in Montana,
rights in water have never been entirely private. An appropriator of water
does not own the water but rather has a right to use it. The 1889 Montana
constitution provided that the use of water is a public use and recognized a
public right of way across private property for the transporting of water.2 46
242. H.B. 680, § 8.
243. Id. at § 10.
244. This possibility is suggested by the "market participation" concept which exempts state
actions with respect to state-owned resources from dormant Commerce Clause violation. It was first
used by the U.S. Supreme Court to uphold a Maryland law which discriminated against out-of-state
scrap dealers. Justice Powell wrote: "Nothing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause
prohibits a state, in the absence of congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising
the right to favor its own citizens over others. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810
(1976). See also South Cent. Timber Dev. v. LeResche, 42 U.S.L.W. 4631 (U.S. May 22, 1984);
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
245. For analysis and discussion of changes and the need for changes in Montana water law, see
Modern Western Legislation as a Patternfor Changes in the Montana Law of Water Rights, 28
MONT. L. REV. 95 (1966); Stone, ProblemsArising Out of Montana'sLaw ofWater Rights, 27 MONT.
L. REV. 1 (1965); Stone, Improving Montana Water Law, 20 MONT. L. REV. 60 (1958); Dunbar, The
Search for a Stable Water Right in Montana, 28 AGRICULTURAL HISTORY (Oct., 1954); Mont.
Depart. of Natural Resources & Conserv., The Framework Report: A Comprehensive Water and
Related Land Resources Plan for the State of Montana (1976).
246. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. Shortly before the 1889 Constitution was
approved, in 1885, the legislature enacted the first statute providing for notice and recording of notice
as a prerequisite of an appropriative water right, as opposed to mere use. This was later held not to be
the exclusive means of acquisition of a water right on nonadjudicated streams; however, it can be seen
as one step toward organization of water rights.
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The original "angling statute" (now section 87-2-305, MCA) was enacted
in 1933 granting an easement to the public for fishing on navigable
streams.247 In 1972 the Montana Constitutional Convention approved a
provision requiring a centralized system for recording water rights and
directing the legislature to provide for the "administration, control, and
regulation of water rights. 248 The legislature responded with the 1973
Water Use Act and later with the 1979 amendments to that act. In
Hildreth and Curran, drawing in part on the 1972 Constitution, the
Montana Supreme Court held public rights in water to be very broad. The
more strict requirements for acquisition ofwater rights enacted in the 1985
Water Policy Act demonstrates an increasing willingness to delegate
decisions on management of water to an administrative agency rather than
permitting them to be made by private citizens.
With each step in this development of the public nature of water and
its use comes the necessary adjustment of the private rights affected. It can
easily be said that the individual property owner loses nothing with each
change, that because the change is based on broad concepts such as the
public trust doctrine, the individual's prior belief as to the extent of his
property right was simply erroneous. This explanation makes sometimes
difficult adjustments no less disruptive or confusing to the individual.
Further change, while sometimes valuable and necessary, conflicts with
the certainty that is a goal of individual water users and water policy
planners. Public water rights are here to stay. The future refinement of
these rights will have to be accomplished by careful decisions on the proper
balance to be maintained between public and private rights in water and
water use.
Recent legislation and court decisions have answered some questions,
and left others unanswered. Important questions that have been addressed
include:
1. Are public trust criteria the same as the public interest
criteria set forth in state statutes?
2. Who has the burden of proof in demonstrating that the
public interest in waters will not be harmed?
3. Will the legislature, the courts, administrative agencies, or a
combination of these branches of government enforce the public
interest?
The 1985 legislature has made definitive and detailed statements as to
public rights in water-both on the issue of stream access and in fashioning
broader state water policy. Specific public interest criteria will now be
applied to new appropriations as well as to water rights transfers. Public
247.
248.

1933 Mont. Laws ch. 95.
MONT. CONsT. art. IX § 3(4).
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recreational rights on the rivers and streams of the state have also been
specifically defined. This legislative elaboration of public rights, coupled
with some public criticism of judicial activism in Curranand Hildreth,will
likely result in judicial deference to what the legislature has done.
In both the stream access and water policy legislation, the 1985

legislature has specified a strong presumption for the protection of the
public interest. In water rights applications, changes, and leasing, the
proponent of change carries the burden of proof in demonstrating that the
public interest has been met. In certain instances, the burden is that of
demonstrating "clear and convincing evidence" that the public interest
criteria have been satisfied.24 9 In cases of proposed uses of water out of the

six specified river basins or for consumption in excess of 4000 ac-ft/yr and
5.5 cfs, there is a conclusive presumption that the public interest cannot be
served unless the state remains involved as lessor of the water.250 Even in

the controversial area of stream access, the legislature established a means
for the Fish and Game Commission to limit the incidence or types of

recreational use of streams in the interests of protecting the aquatic
2 51

ecosystem.
The Montana Legislature has made apparent that, within the
contours left by the court, it will be an active participant in articulating, as
a matter of policy, public rights in water. The implementation of those
principles will be delegated to the administrative agencies, the DNRC for
the implementation of the water policy act and the Department of Fish,
Wildlife and Parks for the implementation of the stream access legislation.
Left unanswered or unaddressed at this time, however, are other
questions. There is uncertainty about the application of the public trust
doctrine to federally reserved water rights in Montana. Expectedly, the
legislature's acts will be scrutinized to determine if there has been a retreat
from the state constitutional mandate to make water available to the
people and subject to appropriation. Doubtless, the question of most
general interest relates to the long-range integration of the public trust
doctrine and appropriative rights.
The history and culture of Montana are integrally linked to its natural
resources, and this is especially true with respect to its waters. The future of
Montana will also be tied to its water resources. In the years to come, the
culture will place increasing value on recreational and other instream uses
of these waters. Also, Montana's water resources will have important
regional importance as there may be economic pressures to move water
out-of-state for such purposes as recharging the groundwater resources of

249.
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251.

H.B. 680, §§ 4(2), 4(3), 7(5)(b).
Id. at § 3.
1985 Mont. Laws ch. 556.
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the Midwest, conveying natural resources, or supplying growing municipal
needs elsewhere in the West.
Recent efforts by the Montana courts and legislature demonstrate
how one state is adapting its water law and policy to changes that are being
manifested elsewhere in the West. The 1972 Montana Constitution and
the public trust doctrine are the vehicles for the greater recognition of
public rights. In the framework of these adaptations, the law will continue
to respond to Montanans' changing relationship to water.

